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THE DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
Jessica Bulman-Pozen* & Miriam Seifter**
In recent years, antidemocratic behavior has rippled across the nation. Lameduck state legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors of their powers; extreme partisan gerrymanders have warped representative institutions;
state officials have nullified popularly adopted initiatives. The federal Constitution offers few resources to address these problems, and ballot-box solutions
cannot work when antidemocratic actions undermine elections themselves.
Commentators increasingly decry the rule of the many by the few.
This Article argues that a vital response has been neglected. State constitutions embody a deep commitment to democracy. Unlike the federal Constitution, they were drafted—and have been repeatedly rewritten and amended—
to empower popular majorities. In text, history, and structure alike, they express a commitment to popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political
equality. We shorthand this commitment the democracy principle and describe its development and current potential.
The Article’s aims are both theoretical and practical. At the level of theory,
we offer a new view of American constitutionalism, one in which the majoritarian commitment of states’ founding documents complements the antimajoritarian tilt of the national document. Such complementarity is an
unspoken premise of the familiar claim that the federal Constitution may
temper excesses and abuses of state majoritarianism. We focus on the other
half of the equation: state constitutions may ameliorate national democratic
shortcomings. At the level of practice, we show how the democracy principle
can inform a number of contemporary conflicts. Reimagining recent cases
concerning electoral interference, political entrenchment, and more, we argue
that it is time to reclaim the state constitutional commitment to democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Fear of democratic decline is all around us. 1 A growing literature offers
different diagnoses of what ails American democracy. Some focus on severe
economic or social inequality, 2 while others decry the smashing of norms of
fair play 3 or the erosion of the rule of law. 4 A common concern, however, is
that the few are wresting control from the many.

1. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018);
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018).
2. See, e.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA? (2017);
GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION (2017).
3. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (2018); Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, The Constitution Won’t Save
American Democracy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/only-social-mobilization-can-save-american-democracy-by-daronacemoglu-and-james-a-robinson-2019-09 [https://perma.cc/N8R6-456V].
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The United States Constitution seems to be part of the problem. Although a number of both classic and recent works have described a federal
constitutional commitment to democracy, 5 commentators increasingly conclude that “[t]he US Constitution will not save American democracy” 6 and,
indeed, that “the Constitution’s text and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely.” 7
In this Article, we argue that there is a vital but neglected constitutional
response to democratic decline. State constitutions furnish powerful resources for addressing antidemocratic behavior. These constitutions “will
not save” us either. But they do provide a stronger foundation for protecting
democracy than their federal counterpart. In text, history, and structure
alike, they privilege “rule by the people,” and especially rule by popular majorities.
In one sense, a call to consider state constitutions is nothing new. For
decades, prominent jurists and scholars have advocated turning to state constitutions to protect individual rights. 8 In the 1970s, for example, scholars
began to write about a “new judicial federalism” in which state courts would
step in as the federal judiciary receded. 9 Yet these scholars have been met
with skepticism: Are state courts well suited to protect individual rights? After all, critics have observed, state constitutions are committed to majoritarianism, which might render protection for unpopular minorities elusive. 10
This now-familiar debate may have obscured a simpler point about state
constitutions, one that has particular significance today: precisely because
they are committed to popular majority rule, state constitutions can help
counter antidemocratic behavior. In contrast to the federal Constitution, for
example, state constitutions expressly confer the right to vote and to participate in free and equal elections, and they devote entire articles to electoral
processes. They provide for numerous executive officials and judges to be

5. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST (1980); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26
(2000); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV.
669 (2014).
6. Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 4; see also Meagan Day & Bhaskar Sunkara,
Opinion, Think the Constitution Will Save Us? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/opinion/constitution-founders-democracy-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/ZH36-FZPC].
7. GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 4, at 4.
8. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
9. See generally ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
113–232 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1702 (2010) (“State constitutions are generally more majoritarian than the
United States Constitution . . . . Advancing individual liberties and furthering equality is thus
inherently more problematic under state constitutions because it puts the rights of the minority more in the hands of the majority.”).
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elected by popular majority vote. They seek to prevent legislative favoritism
and allow the people to engage in direct self-rule through initiatives and referenda. 11
These and numerous other features yield a powerful democratic commitment, a composite of constitutional text, history, and structure we term
the democracy principle as a shorthand. Some state courts have recognized
this principle, both recently and in the past. In this Article, we offer a fuller
treatment, elaborating the many ways state constitutions advance popular
self-rule and explaining both where the democracy principle has been appreciated and where it has been overlooked or ignored.
Of course, critics of the new judicial federalism are correct that majority
rule may pose its own problems. State majorities’ invocations of sovereignty,
in particular, are indelibly connected to slavery and persisting racial injustice. 12 In focusing on popular majorities, we do not deny the need for protection of minority rights. But it is also wrong to equate majority rule with
discrimination. Today, attempts to obstruct popular majorities—for example, through extreme partisan gerrymanders and overrides of ballot initiatives—frequently disadvantage people of color. 13 If it is a mistake to place too
much faith in the democracy principle, it is a greater mistake to neglect it.
Recent years have seen a rash of antidemocratic behavior across the
country—efforts to thwart popular majority rule that have nothing to do
with protecting vulnerable minorities or individual rights. Lame-duck state
legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors and attorneys general
of their powers. State officials have overridden initiatives adopted by the
people to circumvent unresponsive governments on healthcare, criminal justice, and campaign finance. State legislatures have adopted extreme partisan
gerrymanders that devalue the vote and undermine political equality. 14 State
constitutions—as implemented by judges or by politicians, activists, or the
public at large—offer legal responses to these behaviors. Indeed, state courts
have recently held unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders in North Caroli-

11. See infra Part I (describing the state constitutional commitment to democracy).
12. See infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text.
13. Two recent examples are North Carolina’s gerrymandering practices and the Florida
legislature’s gutting of Amendment 4, which would have restored the voting rights of certain
persons with felony convictions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472–74 (2017)
(describing the entwinement of partisanship and race in the context of districting); Raysor v.
DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application
to vacate stay) (recounting the history of Florida’s Amendment 4); Ari Berman, Unlock the
Vote: Inside the Unlikely Movement that Could Restore Voting Rights to 1.4 Million Floridians,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/inside-theunlikely-movement-that-could-restore-voting-rights-to-1-4-million-floridians/ [https://perma
.cc/2A6D-UL3Z] (discussing the discriminatory origins of felon-disenfranchisement laws and
their disproportionate impact on Black voters).
14. See infra Part III (exploring these state actions).
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na and Pennsylvania, 15 but the state commitment to democracy extends further than existing cases recognize.
Because state officials have been responsible for many of the most troubling actions across the United States in recent years, state constitutions address a problem that is national in scope. Just as antidemocratic actions have
rippled across states, leading some to decry the states as “[l]aboratories of
[o]ligarchy” 16 or potential “laboratories of authoritarianism,” 17 prodemocratic constitutional responses in one state readily inform those in another.
These responses shape the federal government as well because the federal
Constitution relies on states as units of representation and administrators of
elections.
The democracy principle can also shed light on American constitutionalism more generally. State and federal constitutions present alternative visions, but so too they are complements, parts of the whole of American
constitutionalism. 18 For example, insofar as the federal Constitution worries
particularly about majoritarian abuses and state constitutions worry about
minority faction, they may work together to respond to both the tyranny of
the majority and minority rule. Yet while courts and scholars have long recognized the federal Constitution’s promise of tempering state majoritarianism, they have not similarly appreciated the ways in which state
constitutions may respond to national democratic shortcomings—at least if
state constitutions are properly understood.
Part I of this Article describes the state constitutional commitment to
democracy. Part II brings in the federal Constitution, considering both how
state constitutions may help us reason differently about American constitutionalism and how state and federal constitutions are best understood as
complementary. Part III takes up practical applications, explaining state constitutional responses to a variety of contemporary conflicts, from gerrymandering to lame-duck entrenchment to legislative overrides of ballot
initiatives.
I.

DEMOCRACY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Scholars of state constitutions have long recognized in passing that they
privilege popular majorities. Daniel Elazar speaks of their “emphasis on di-

15. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 801–02 (Pa. 2018);
Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 WL 4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
2019).
16. Matt Ford, The GOP’s Laboratories of Oligarchy, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/152515/gops-laboratories-oligarchy [https://perma.cc/27T2C5N9].
17. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 1, at 2.
18. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3–5 (2006);
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS 2 (2008); Donald S. Lutz, The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 23 (1988).

864

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:859

rect, continuing consent of popular majorities,” 19 for example, while Douglas
Reed notes their “penetrability by democratic majorities,” 20 and Emily
Zackin argues that they have struck a “more majoritarian balance than their
federal counterpart.” 21 Because much writing about state constitutions has
concerned efforts to protect individual rights, this embrace of popular majorities is often bemoaned or downplayed when it is discussed at all. 22 Yet it
warrants attention as a feature, not a bug, both of state constitutions themselves and of the broader landscape of American constitutionalism.
This Part describes state constitutions’ distinct democratic commitment. 23 After explaining our holistic interpretive approach, which tailors familiar modalities of text, history, and structure to the state context, we make
three main claims. First, popular sovereignty is the animating, fundamental
principle of state constitutions. From the very beginning, these constitutions
have proclaimed that all government power resides in the people, and they
have regularly refined and expanded channels for unmediated expressions of
popular sovereignty. Second, state constitutions widely understand the people to be a body that governs through majority rule. With respect to constitutional adoption and amendment, as well as both direct democracy and
voting for representative institutions, state constitutions treat the majority as
the best approximation of the people and indicate that the preference of the
majority is to prevail in the face of political disagreement. Third, state constitutions embrace a distinctive vision of political equality. These constitutions
propose that all members of the political community share in the power to
influence government and further seek to foreclose forms of special treatment by government, understanding equality as both a necessary input and
output of political institutions.
As a shorthand, we describe these interrelated state constitutional commitments to popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality as the
democracy principle. Although this tripartite definition is certainly not the
only understanding of democracy, an exemplary essentially contested concept, 24 it accords with extensive commentary. 25 Moreover, this understand-

19. Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions,
PUBLIUS, Winter 1982, at 11, 12.
20. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 887 (1999).
21. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES 25 (2013).
22. See, e.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 10, at 1702.
23. Our discussion is specific to the fifty states, but the democracy principle may have
broader purchase in American constitutionalism. See, e.g., P.R. CONST. pmbl. (LEXIS Law Publishing, LexisNexis through Dec. 2005) (“The democratic system is fundamental to the life of
the Puerto Rican community. We understand that the democratic system of government is one
in which the will of the people is the source of public power, the political order is subordinate
to the rights of man, and the free participation of the citizen in collective decisions is assured.”).
24. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 183–87 (1956).
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ing of “rule by the people” leaves open room for contestation with respect to
both the three subsidiary commitments we identify and the overarching
concept of democracy itself.
It may be helpful in this respect to analogize the democracy principle to
more familiar constitutional concepts, such as federalism or the separation
of powers. Each of those constitutional concepts has textual, historical, and
structural hooks, and scholars and jurists widely view them as defining features of the federal Constitution, even as they lack express definition. 26
Moreover, both federalism and the separation of powers are operationalized
through a variety of subsidiary doctrines—such as the anticommandeering
doctrine for federalism and presidential removal requirements for the separation of powers—as well as through canons of construction and avoidance.
Commentators spar over the correct parameters for those doctrines, but they
do not hesitate to agree that they are discussing constitutional doctrines. The
democracy principle has comparable status. Even as disagreements may ensue over its precise content and application, there should be little question
that it is a defining feature of state constitutions.
A.

Interpreting State Constitutions

Before we explore the democracy principle, a few words are in order
about our interpretive approach. In many respects, our method is a familiar
holistic one that looks to text, history, and structure (and weaves in doctrinal
and prudential considerations as we turn to specific applications), 27 but a few
notable departures follow from the fact that these are state constitutions we
are expounding.
Most obviously, there is the question of constitutions, plural. Given fifty
different state constitutions, adopted and amended by different people, in
different places, at different times, is it possible to describe a shared state
constitutional commitment? Although we recognize variance across the
25. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34 (1956)
(“Running through the whole history of democratic theories is the identification of ‘democracy’ with political equality, popular sovereignty, and rule by majorities.”); AUSTIN RANNEY &
WILLMOORE KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 23–39 (1956) (defining democracy in terms of “popular sovereignty,” “political equality,” “popular consultation,”
and “majority rule”); Jon Elster, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1, 1
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (“Democracy I shall understand as simple majority
rule, based on the principle ‘One person one vote.’ ”). This definition tracks longstanding descriptions of democracy, from Aristotle’s to Locke’s to Lincoln’s, and more. See DAHL, supra, at
34–35 (collecting definitions).
26. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 5, at 30 (“[T]he phrases ‘separation of powers’ and
‘checks and balances’ appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these organizing concepts are
part of the document, read holistically.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Federalism as a Constitutional
Concept, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 961, 968 (2017).
27. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (describing modalities
of constitutional argument); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (arguing for the integration of interpretive approaches); infra Part III (considering particular applications).
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states—including provisions, histories, and politics that are unique to particular jurisdictions or shared by only a subset of the states—we nonetheless
believe that it is reasonable, and ultimately more instructive, to speak of a
common democracy principle.
First, as Section I.B canvasses, state constitutions contain many identical
or substantially similar provisions. Call it “massive plagiarism,” 28 “stare decisis,” 29 or an “imitative art,” 30 but this is no accident. From the eighteenth
century until the present, drafters of state constitutional provisions have
consulted and copied other states’ foundational texts. The earliest state constitutions were reproduced in widely circulated compilations, which “facilitated the first wave of constitution-making after the Revolution and
produced an enduring trait of American constitution-making: a clear instinct for comparison, modeling, and borrowing.” 31 Although some of the
borrowing demonstrated a regional character, much more of it did not. At
Nevada’s 1864 Convention, for example, a delegate noted that in “following
the line of the California Constitution, we are only following in that of
the . . . Constitution of the State of New York; a State which has given her
Constitution to very many of the western States of this Union.” 32
Second, state constitutions have been drafted, replaced, and amended in
response to national historical developments. Scholars tend to believe that
“the date of a constitution’s adoption is usually a better indicator of its content than the region in which it originated.” 33 Here, too, though, the tradition is multifarious: the frequent rewriting and amendment of state
constitutions means that most reflect numerous historical periods, not a single one. In particular, as Section I.C discusses, the Jacksonian Era, Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, and the Reapportionment Revolution were
fertile times for constitutional conventions across the states following the
initial eighteenth-century founding moment. 34 Constitutional provisions
adopted during these periods were more likely to reflect “coordinated efforts
28. JOAN WELLS COWARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 166 (1979).
29. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 224–25 (1950).
30. John Walker Mauer, State Constitutions in a Time of Crisis: The Case of the Texas
Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (1990).
31. Marsha L. Baum & Christian G. Fritz, American Constitution-Making: The Neglected
State Constitutional Sources, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199, 207–08 (2000). State conventions
often provided compilations of existing state constitutions for all delegates. See id. at 200. In
the twentieth century, the National Municipal League began to publish a model state constitution, underscoring the idea of a unified state constitutional project, although the impact of this
document was not comparable to state constitutions themselves. See G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 152–53 (1998).
32. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, ASSEMBLED AT CARSON CITY, JULY 4TH, 1864, TO
FORM A CONSTITUTION AND STATE GOVERNMENT 16 (S.F., Frank Eastman 1866) (statement of
Charles DeLong) [hereinafter NEVADA 1864 DEBATES].
33. TARR, supra note 31, at 91.
34. See generally DINAN, supra note 18, at 7–11, tbl.1-1 (offering a periodized overview
and noting dates of state constitutional conventions).
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of national social movements, working through states,” than interests unique
to a particular jurisdiction or region. 35
Finally, the fact that national movements frequently did (and continue
to) work through the states relates to another reason for perceiving a shared
state constitutional commitment that we take up in the next Part: their
common relationship to the federal Constitution. 36
Without denying differences among state constitutions, we accordingly
believe it is plausible to posit a shared democracy principle. The need for
state-specific context and nuance should not dissuade us from understanding a distinct American constitutionalism located in the states. This constitutionalism, and especially its difference from and possibly complementary
relationship to the federal Constitution, can only be fully appreciated by
studying the states together. In pursuing this approach, we therefore align
ourselves with prominent scholars of state constitutional law who discern a
shared “state constitutional tradition” or embrace a “trans-state constitutional theory.” 37 Although most of this work has a different focus from our
own, the rich accounts of John Dinan, G. Alan Tarr, and Robert Williams
particularly inform our understanding. 38 We likewise follow the approach of
state courts, which have long looked to other states in interpreting their constitutions. 39 The democracy principle we explore below admits of state-by35. ZACKIN, supra note 21, at 31; see, e.g., ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY:
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1890–1925 (1997). As we have each suggested in prior work, state law and policy more
generally tend to reflect the American people operating in a federal system more than the views
of distinct state peoples. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1077 (2014); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100
VA. L. REV. 953 (2014). For scholars advancing variants of this view with respect to state constitutional law specifically, see JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(2005), and Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993).
36. See infra Part II.
37. DINAN, supra note 18, at 5; Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its
Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 301 (1998); see also, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); GARDNER, supra note
35, at 21; Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945
(1994); Kahn, supra note 35, at 1160.
38. See, e.g., DINAN, supra note 18; TARR, supra note 31; WILLIAMS, supra note 9.
39. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS
IN STATE AND NATION (1988) (discussing interstate borrowing); James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 783, 790 (2003) (finding that more than a third of cases studied “cited decisions from other states when interpreting . . . state constitutional provisions”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert
A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 792–804 (1981) (concluding, in a study of state court decisions
between 1870 and 1970, that each state “owes highest allegiance to its own case law, but also
makes liberal use of outside cases . . . enough to support the idea that [state supreme courts]
regard themselves as siblings of a single legal family, speaking dialects of a common legal lan-
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state variation and can only be applied with attention to a particular constitution’s text, history, and structure, but its core components are remarkably
consistent.
To derive these components, we tailor our interpretive approach to the
state context. State constitutions tend to be quite long and detailed, especially as compared to their federal counterpart, so we begin with their specific
provisions. 40 We then seek to make sense of copious text by incorporating
structural and historical interpretation. While “holistic, structural” 41 approaches are most familiar in federal interpretive practice when text is
sparse—for example, with respect to federalism and the separation of powers 42—a structural approach to state constitutions helps to harmonize ample
text. State constitutions’ plentiful text facilitates the “close and perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of
reasoning” that Charles Black advocated but that is often difficult for the
federal document. 43
This plentiful text follows in part from state constitutions’ frequent
amendment. Although certain provisions of eighteenth-century state constitutions persist, the story of state constitutionalism is a story of continual
change. Tens of new states, hundreds of new constitutions, and thousands of
amendments 44 complicate any account of the eighteenth century as a central
reference point. Prominent debates concerning species of originalism in fed-

guage”); Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 23 (1988) (“The
prevailing practice has been for the courts in one state to consider, and often cite in support of
their own decisions, the developing jurisprudence in other states.”). Some courts encourage
litigants to cite out-of-state decisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895
(Pa. 1991) (indicating that litigants should brief constitutional decisions from other states);
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 1985) (“The advocate may also use a sibling state approach in state constitutional argument. This involves seeing what other states with identical
or similar constitutional clauses have done.”).
40. Alabama’s is the longest at nearly 400,000 words; the vast majority fall between
10,000 and 100,000 words. ALA. CONST.
41. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2001); see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1969) (defining structural interpretation as drawing “inference[s] from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its
parts or in some principal part”); see also, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 74.
42. From McCulloch v. Maryland’s “confidence” analysis, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428–
29 (1819), to Alden v. Maine’s atextual sovereign immunity, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), to Murphy v. NCAA’s recent reaffirmation of the anticommandeering principle, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018), these structural interpretations turn to architecture in the absence of (and sometimes in
the teeth of) text. See generally Amar, supra note 5 (noting that federalism and the separation
of powers emerge from a holistic reading of the federal Constitution).
43. BLACK, supra note 41, at 31; see Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115
MICH. L. REV. 215, 225–29 (2016) (discussing “institutional structuralism” in state constitutional interpretation).
44. JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 23 (2018).
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eral constitutional interpretation thus find less traction at the state level;
meanwhile, attending to changes over time is more informative. Our historical discussion accordingly focuses on revision and replacement, considering
how high-level commitments have assumed different expressions as state
populations have responded to perceived shortcomings.
B. Provisions
We begin with an overview of widely shared provisions that inform the
democracy principle. The list that follows is not exhaustive. In particular, we
do not canvass provisions also found in the federal Constitution, such as
rights to petition, assembly, and jury trial, as our aim is to highlight distinctive aspects of state constitutions. Moreover, we reserve consideration of
provisions that more indirectly instantiate a democratic commitment, such
as guarantees of public education 45 and restrictions on private as well as public discrimination. 46 But the following provisions offer a starting point for
exploring the state constitutional commitment to democracy:
(1) Source & Ends of Political Power. Every state constitution but New
York’s 47 includes an express commitment to popular sovereignty. The most
common formulation declares that “all political power is inherent in the
people.” 48 Other constitutions maintain that “all political power is vested in
and derived from the people” 49 or that government “originates with the peo-

45. See, e.g., ZACKIN, supra note 21, at 67–105; Derek W. Black, The Constitutional
Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 772–94 (2018) (describing state
education clauses as essential to equality and self-rule).
46. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 7, 20–21 (1993).
47. New York’s first constitution contained such a proclamation. N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. I (“[N]o authority shall, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the people or members of this State but such as shall be derived from and granted by them.”).
48. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 2; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2; ARK.
CONST. art. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 2; KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 2; KY. CONST.
§ 4; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 2.a; N.D. CONST. art.
I, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 26; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. Some states simply state that “all
power is inherent in the people.” IND. CONST. art. 1, § 1; ME. CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. art.
I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 1. For other slight
variations, see HAW. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power of this State is inherent in the people . . . .”); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the people, in whom all political power is inherent . . . .”); and VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 6
(“That all power being originally inherent in and co[n]sequently derived from the people . . . .”).
49. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 5; MO. CONST. art. I, § 1; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; see
also MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. V; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8; VA. CONST. art. I, § 2;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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ple” 50 or derives its power “from the consent of the governed.” 51 This idea of
popular sovereignty is linked not only to the people’s initial creation of state
constitutions but also to their ongoing right to change them: most state constitutions expressly refer to the right of the people to “alter” (or “reform” or
“modify”) or “abolish” the very constitutions and governments they create. 52
These constitutions also connect popular sovereignty to the pursuit of the
common good. For example, they provide that “[g]overnment is instituted
for [the people’s] protection, security, and benefit” 53 or that “all government,
of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the whole.” 54
(2) Suffrage. Every state constitution confers the right to vote. 55 Arizona’s provision is framed most indirectly, declaring that “[n]o person shall be
entitled to vote . . . unless such person be a citizen of the United States of the
age of eighteen years or over, and shall have resided in the state for the peri-

50. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; LA. CONST. art.1, § 1; see MD. CONST. declaration of rights,
art. 1.
51. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1. Delaware’s
popular sovereignty clause is found in its preamble, DEL. CONST. pmbl., and Rhode Island’s
quotes George Washington, R.I. CONST. art. I, § 1.
52. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 2; DEL. CONST. pmbl.; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; IND.
CONST. art. 1, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 2; KY. CONST. bill of rights, § 4; ME. CONST. art. I, § 2;
MD. CONST. declaration of rights, art. 1; MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. VII; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 6; MO. CONST. art. I, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 2;
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 10; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 2; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 1; OR. CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 2; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
53. Twenty-three states have this or similar language. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2.
54. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 1; MD. CONST. declaration of rights,
art. 1; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 5; MO. CONST. art. I, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2.
55. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177; ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2;
ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; CONN. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2; GA. CONST. art. II, § 1; HAW. CONST.
art. II; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 1; IOWA CONST.
art. II, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 1; KY. CONST. § 145; LA. CONST. art. I, § 10(A); ME. CONST.
art. II, § 1; MD. CONST. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. IX; MICH. CONST. art.
II, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241; MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2;
MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22; NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I,
art. 11; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.C. CONST.
art. VI, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OR.
CONST. art. II, § 1; PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 19; TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I,
§ 1; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 8; VA. CONST. art. I, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1; W. VA. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 1. See generally Joshua A. Douglas,
The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–05, 144–49 (2014).
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od of time preceding such election as prescribed by law,” 56 but even this provision effectively qualifies voters who meet the eligibility requirements. The
other forty-nine state constitutions include an explicit affirmative right. For
example, Colorado provides, “Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years, has resided in this state for such time as may
be prescribed by law, and has been duly registered as a voter if required by
law shall be qualified to vote at all elections.” 57 Other states use similar formulations, such as that citizens “shall have the right to vote,” “may vote,” or
are “qualified elector[s].” 58
In addition to conferring the franchise, a large number of states furnish
further electoral protections. Twenty-six state constitutions declare that elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open.” 59 Twenty-eight
foreclose particular restrictions on the franchise, such as interference by civil
or military powers, or simply prohibit “disenfranchise[ment].” 60 And twen-

56. ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
57. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
58. See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177; ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 1;
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2; GA. CONST. art. II, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art.
III, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 1; KY. CONST.
§ 145; LA. CONST. art. I, § 10(A); ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; MD. CONST. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST.
declaration of rights, art. IX; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. 12, § 241; MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.M. CONST.
art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 1; OHIO
CONST. art. V, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OR. CONST. art. II, § 2; PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; R.I.
CONST. art. II, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. II, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42; VA. CONST. art. II,
§ 1; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1; WYO.
CONST. art. 6, § 2. These provisions are also tallied in Douglas, supra note 55, at 144–49.
59. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 21; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 5; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 1; KY. CONST. § 6; MD. CONST.
declaration of rights, art. 1, § 7; MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. IX; MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 25; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 13; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 5; OR. CONST. art. II, § 1; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 17; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 8; VA. CONST. art. I, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see, e.g., Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175 S.W. 1022, 1026–27 (Ky.
1915); Neelley v. Farr, 158 P. 458, 467 (Colo. 1916).
60. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 21; id. art. VII, § 2; ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 22; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 19; id. art. I,
§ 20; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 2; MO. CONST. art. I, § 25; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 13; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22; NEV.
CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 8;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; PA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
S.C. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 19; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. I,
§ 17; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 19; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 11; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
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ty-seven protect voters from arrest during their attendance at or travel to or
from an election. 61
(3) Plural Elected Executive. State constitutions favor elected offices filled
by statewide popular vote. 62 In addition to the governor and lieutenant governor, states elect a number of other executive actors, including attorneys
general, secretaries of state, treasurers, auditors, controllers, and superintendents. 63 Moreover, there is no Electoral College equivalent; whoever receives
the highest number of votes statewide for these offices prevails. 64
(4) Elected Judges. State constitutions also favor elections for the judiciary. The vast majority of states provide either for the election of judges in the

61. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 192; ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 4;
COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 5; CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 5; IND. CONST. art.
2, § 12; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 2; KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 7; KY. CONST. § 149; LA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3; ME. CONST. art. II, § 2; MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 102; MONT.
CONST. art. IV, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 5; OR. CONST. art. II, § 13;
PA. CONST. art. VII, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. II, § 11; TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; TEX. CONST. art.
VI, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 3; VA. CONST. art. II, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; W. VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 3.
62. Forty state constitutions provide expressly for the governor to be the candidate who
receives the highest number of votes in a statewide contest. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 115; ALASKA
CONST. art. III, § 3; ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; HAW. CONST. art.
V, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 4; KY. CONST.
§ 70; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 3; MD. CONST. art. II, § 3; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV; MO.
CONST. art. IV, § 18; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. 5,
§ 4; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 42; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.Y.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. 6, § 5;
OR. CONST. art. II, § 16; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. IV,
§ 5; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3; UTAH CONST.
art. VII, § 2; VA. CONST. art. V, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4; W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3;
WIS. CONST. art. V, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 3. Three states use a different approach. GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-501(a)(1) (West 2019); MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 140; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 47.
All states tally votes for other elected executive-branch offices in the same manner as for their
selection of governor. For a compilation of and commentary on these provisions, see D. Gregory Sanford & Paul Gillies, And if There Be No Choice Made: A Meditation on Section 47 of the
Vermont Constitution, 27 VT. L. REV. 783 (2003).
63. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1;
see Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1537, 1552
(2019) (“Forty-three states popularly elect an attorney general; thirty-seven elect a secretary of
state, thirty-four elect a treasurer, twenty-four elect an auditor, and twenty-two elect a superintendent of public instruction or members of a board of education.” (footnotes omitted)); Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence: Appendices, SSRN 1–113 (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3369026
[https://perma.cc/K5K4LNTC].
64. Mississippi was long an exception: an 1890 provision designed to disenfranchise
Black voters required candidates for statewide office to win both the popular vote and the
highest number of House districts; if no candidate won both, the House would choose from the
two highest vote-getters. In November 2020, however, Mississippi voters adopted Ballot Measure 2, which eliminates the electoral vote requirement and instead provides for a runoff process. The state legislature referred the ballot initiative to voters following a federal lawsuit. See
McLemore v. Hosemann, 414 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Miss 2019).
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first instance or for retention elections following appointment. 65 More than
most other state constitutional provisions, judicial selection has a regional
character: governors appoint judges in nine New England and upper MidAtlantic states, and legislatures appoint judges in Virginia and South Carolina. 66 In the other thirty-nine states, judges face elections.
(5) Redistricting & Apportionment. State constitutions provide for apportioning legislative districts by population for both houses of the legislature. 67 At the time the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was
ratified, nearly three-quarters of state constitutions provided for apportionment based on population. 68 Around the turn of the twentieth century, however, some states provided for one house to be apportioned by population
and the other by geographical area, 69 and many more failed or refused to reapportion their legislatures despite significant population shifts from rural to
urban areas. 70 Attempts to defend such disparities, by comparing them to the
U.S. Senate among other things, failed in Reynolds v. Sims, which held that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires districting based on population. 71 To-

65. See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012); Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., http://judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Supreme [https://perma
.cc/M2NL-B7T7].
66. See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. IX; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 46; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2; N.J.
CONST. art. VI, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; S.C.
CONST. art. V, § 3.
67. In the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont tried unicameral
legislatures. Today, only Nebraska has one. DINAN, supra note 18, at 138.
68. See DOUGLAS KEITH & ERIC PETRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., APPORTIONMENT OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, 1776-1920, at 3, 10–79, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files
/legal-work/Apportionment%20of%20State%20Legislatures%201776-1920.pdf [https://perma
.cc/LUN3-MQKV] (collecting provisions). Only two of the original thirteen state constitutions
so provided, PA. CONST. of 1776, § 17; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 3, art. II, but because populations were more evenly distributed, apportionment by area or other metric did not tend to
yield substantial disparities. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 25–26 (1965).
69. E.g., IOWA CONST. art. III, §§ 34–36 (repealed 1904); see ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 82–83 (1968) (describing the attraction of “little federal plans”
as state populations shifted to urban areas).
70. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (describing Tennessee’s refusal to reapportion
and resulting malapportionment); J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE
UNITED STATES 11–22 (2014) (explaining how racism, nativism, antiurban sentiment, and the
desire to entrench incumbent power drove refusals to reapportion); Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L. REV. 485, 488–92, 496–97 (2015) (discussing how failures to reapportion after the Great Migration led to “massive underrepresentation of urban centers”).
71. 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). To be sure, Reynolds was highly controversial in state political circles. See, e.g., Note, The Reaction to the Reapportionment Cases, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1232–37 (1966) (describing proposed constitutional amendments and widespread lobbying to
overturn or limit Reynolds); James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled
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day, state constitutions all contemplate apportionment of legislative districts
by population. 72 In addition, a number of state constitutions take redistricting out of legislative hands by entrusting redistricting to nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions. 73
(6) Legislative Accountability. State constitutions also contain accountability mechanisms intended to keep legislators responsive to the public and
to facilitate public monitoring of government action. First, many states limit
the length of legislative sessions and impose term limits to encourage rotation in office. 74 In the words of Colorado’s constitution, term limits are designed “to broaden the opportunities for public service and to assure that the
general assembly is representative of [state] citizens.” 75 State constitutions

Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 31, 46
(2014) (lamenting that, after Reynolds, states “almost immediately reconverged on a solution
that changed as little as possible of the discredited prior institutional structure”). Yet the commitment to equipopulous districts is an important feature of state constitutions, even if (and
perhaps especially if) it has often been at odds with the beliefs of state political actors. See infra
Part II; cf. SMITH, supra note 70, at 20 (noting that, “[b]y ensuring minority control of government in a purportedly democratic nation,” state malapportionment “stood on a shaky foundation”).
72. Most state constitutions provide expressly for equipopulous districts. See ALA.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 198–200; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 3; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; ARK.
CONST. art. 8, §§ 2–3; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48.1; DEL. CONST. art.
2, § 2A; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 21; HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4–6; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; IND.
CONST. art. 4, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 34; KAN. CONST. art. 10, § 1; KY. CONST. § 33; LA.
CONST. art. III, § 6; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2; id. pt. 2, § 2; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4; MASS.
CONST. amend. arts. XXI, XXII, LXXI; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 7; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5; NEV. CONST.
art. 4, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 9, 26; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4; N.C.
CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 4; OR. CONST. art.
IV, § 6; PA. CONST. art. II, § 16; R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VIII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. III,
§§ 4, 6; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 4; TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25–28; VT.
CONST. ch. II, §§ 13, 18; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; W. VA. CONST. art.
II, § 4; id. art. VI, §§ 4, 7; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 3. Some states provide
only indirectly for equipopulous districts. Three state constitutions instead require districts to
comply with the federal Constitution. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 5;
MISS. CONST. art. 13, § 254. And four simply provide for districts to be changed following the
federal decennial census. GA. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art.
5, § 11A; UTAH CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Part II (discussing state-federal constitutional
complementarity).
73. See infra notes 323–328 and accompanying text.
74. For constitutional limits on length of legislative sessions, see, for example, ARK.
CONST. art. 5, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10; and NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 2. For constitutional
term-limit provisions, see ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 21; ARK. CONST. amend. 73; CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; LA. CONST. art. III, § 4;
MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 54; MO. CONST. art. III, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 8; NEB. CONST. art.
III, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3–4; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 17A; and
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 6.
75. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
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also contain detailed legislative-procedure requirements. 76 They require bills
to retain their original purpose and not be altered or amended to change this
purpose, to be referred to committee, to be printed, to be limited to a single
subject that is clearly expressed in the title, to be read and considered by the
legislature on multiple days, and to be adopted only following the recording
of yes and no votes. 77 State constitutions also generally require both houses
of the legislature to keep and publish journals of their proceedings, and
many require proceedings to be open to the public. 78 So too, many state constitutions require bills to receive a majority vote in each house, prohibiting a
minority from enacting legislation. 79
(7) Public & General Purposes. State constitutions also generally include
substantive constraints that limit “special” legislation. 80 For example, Illinois’s typical prohibition declares, “The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.” 81 Many
constitutions also contain lists of prohibited subjects, 82 and some clarify that

76. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
169, 201–07 (1983).
77. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (preserve original purpose); WYO. CONST. art. 3,
§ 23 (referred to committee); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14 (printed for members); KAN. CONST.
art. 2, § 16 (single subject); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 18 (considered on multiple days); ALASKA
CONST. art. II, § 14 (recording of yes/no votes).
78. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (journal publication); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11
(same); CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 7(c)(1) (proceedings open to public); GA. CONST. art. III, § 4,
para. XI (same).
79. E.g., MONT. CONST. art. V, § 11 (“No bill shall become law except by a vote of the
majority of all members present and voting.”); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 18; UTAH CONST. art. VI,
§ 22.
80. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 104–07; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 2, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 25; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25;
CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 10–11; GA. CONST.
art. III, § 6, para. IV; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 13; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 22; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 30; KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 17; KY. CONST.
§§ 59–60; LA. CONST. art. III, §§ 12(A), 13; MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; MICH. CONST. art. IV,
§ 29; MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 87; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 40–42;
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 20; N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § 7, para. 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24;
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 46, 59; OR.
CONST. art. IV, § 23; PA. CONST. art. III, § 32; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. III,
§ 34; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56; UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 26; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28; W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 39; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 31; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 27. For a similar compilation, see
Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 721
n.6 (2012).
81. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
82. The most common examples are prohibitions or limitations on legislative authorization of lotteries or gambling; there are also other, more idiosyncratic examples. See, e.g., ALA.
CONST. art. IV, § 65 (lotteries); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (lottery tickets and casinos); GA.
CONST. art. III, § 6, para. V (regulation of municipal utilities); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (gambling); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 48 (creation of a state immigration bureau); OR. CONST. art. I,
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the legislature must not suspend laws for the benefit of particular individuals
or corporations. 83 In a similar vein, most state constitutions require that state
money be used only for public purposes. 84
(8) Initiative. State constitutions also provide a variety of ways for the
people to engage directly in lawmaking. Most significant is the initiative.
Currently, twenty-four states have an initiative process. 85 Eighteen have a
constitutional initiative process, 86 and twenty-one have a statutory initiative
process. 87 In states that recognize the initiative, constitutional provisions
generally declare that “[t]he people may propose and enact laws by the initiative” 88 or that “the people reserve to themselves the power to propose legislative measures, laws, and amendments to the Constitution,” 89 and they
contemplate approval by majority vote. 90

§ 30 (“No law shall be passed prohibiting emigration from the State.”); R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 22
(gambling); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (lotteries); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 27 (lotteries); VT.
CONST. § 60 (legislative declarations of treason).
83. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 108; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 87;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
84. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“The money of the state shall not be given or
loaned to or in aid of any private corporation or association, or private undertaking . . . .”); see
also Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose Doctrine,
12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 143, 143 n.1 (1993) (finding that all states but Kansas, Maine,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin have such provisions). Even the four states that lack an express
textual provision observe a public-purpose doctrine. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE
REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 663–88 (8th ed.
2016).
85. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1;
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art.
III, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18; MASS. CONST. amend. art.
XLVIII; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273; MO. CONST art. III, § 49; MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1;
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III,
§ 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52.
86. The states with statutory but not constitutional initiative processes are Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See supra note 85.
87. The states with constitutional but not statutory initiative processes are Florida, Illinois, and Mississippi. See supra note 85.
88. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1; see also ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18; MONT. CONST.
art. III, § 4; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52.
89. ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1; see also MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; MISS. CONST. art. 15,
§ 273; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
90. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 ; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(5); ARK.
CONST. art. 5, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(4)(a); ME. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 3, § 19; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, ch. 5, § 1; MO. CONST. art. III, § 51; MICH.
CONST. art. II, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2(3); N.D. CONST. art. III,
§ 8; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(4)(d); WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 1(d); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f). Some provide for a majority vote by statute.
IDAHO CODE § 34-1811 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-5-132(6) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 2-1-12 (2012 & Supp. 2019); UTAH CODE § 20A-7-211(3) (2019). A handful of states impose
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As those provisions suggest, most direct-democracy states describe the
initiative as a popular withholding of power from the legislature. 91 These
provisions further insulate direct democracy from representative government by providing that the gubernatorial veto does not extend to initiative
measures approved by a majority of voters. 92
(9) Referendum. Every state provides for the legislative referendum,
which allows the legislature (or sometimes another government actor) to
place a measure on the ballot for popular approval by a majority of voters. 93
In addition, nearly every state that recognizes the popular initiative also recognizes the popular referendum, which allows the people to reject laws or
constitutional amendments passed by the state legislature. 94 Florida, Illinois,
and Mississippi recognize the initiative but not the referendum, while Maryland and New Mexico recognize the referendum but not the initiative. 95
As with the initiative, state constitutional provisions for referenda generally declare the people’s right to “approve or reject acts of the legislature by
the referendum,” often exempting appropriations from this power, and they
contemplate adoption by a majority vote. 96 The referendum is also common-

a higher bar for constitutional initiatives. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (requiring “fiftyfive percent of the votes cast thereon”).
91. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1 (“The legislative authority of the state shall
be vested in the legislature . . . but the people reserve the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the legislature . . . .”). For similar reservations of power to the people, see ARK.
CONST. art. 5, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; MASS. CONST. amend.
art. XLVIII, ch. 1; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; MISS. CONST. art. 15,
§ 273; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2; N.D.
CONST. art. III, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
and WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1.
92. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(a); ARK.
CONST. art. 5, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(4)(a); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 19; MASS. CONST.
art. XLVIII, ch. 5, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10; MO. CONST. art.
III, § 52(b); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8; OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 1b; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II,
§ 1(d); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f); see also, e.g., Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1364 n.5 (Cal. 1991) (“[T]he Governor has no veto power over initiatives.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-212 (3)(a) (2019) (“The governor may not veto a law
adopted by the people.”).
93. See Table 1.2: States with Legislative Referendum (LR) for Statutes and Constitutional
Amendments, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs
/Legislative-Referendum-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/95C8-2EJP] (identifying states with constitutional or legislative referenda).
94. See HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 78–79 (2014); sources cited
supra note 85.
95. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
96. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(5); ARK. CONST. art. 5,
§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(3)–(4); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3,
§ 17(1); MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, ch. 1, § 3; MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; MICH. CONST.
art. II, § 9; MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(b); NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 1(3); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1c; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3; OR. CONST. art.
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ly framed as a withholding of power from the legislature 97 and is not subject
to the gubernatorial veto. 98
(10) Recall. Nineteen states allow the people to recall state officials before the end of their terms. 99 Some recall provisions extend to appointed as
well as elected officials, 100 while some extend to only a subset of elected officials—for example, excluding judges. 101 Like the initiative and referenda, recall provisions generally contemplate a majority vote. 102
(11) Amendment. State constitutions generally provide for multiple
paths to constitutional amendment: conventions, legislative amendments,
and, in nearly half of the states, constitutional initiatives. All states recognize
the convention, 103 and fourteen states have a periodic convention call that
directly submits the question of whether to hold a constitutional convention
to voters every set number of years. 104 State legislatures may also propose
IV, § 1(4)(d); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(d); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f). For statutory provisions, see IDAHO CODE § 34-1811 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-5-132(6) (2019); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-12 (2012 & Supp. 2019); UTAH CODE § 20A-7-310(3) (2019).
97. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 19,
§ 2(1).
98. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(3)(c); WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 1(d).
99. Eighteen states provide for recalls in their constitutions. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8;
ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; GA.
CONST. art. II, § 2, para. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 7; KAN. CONST.
art. 4, § 3; LA. CONST. art. X, § 26; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; NEV.
CONST. art. 2, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 10; OR. CONST. art. II, § 18; R.I.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; WASH CONST. art. I, § 33; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12. Montana does so by
statute. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-635 (2019).
100. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1.
101. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8.
102. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. III,
§ 7.
103. See ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 286; ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 2; ARIZ. CONST. art.
XXI, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2;
DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. IV; HAW.
CONST. art. XVII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art.
X, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 14, § 2; KY. CONST. § 258; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; MD. CONST. art.
XIV, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 2; MO. CONST. art. XII, § 3(a);
MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. 16, § 2; N.H. CONST.
pt. II, art. 100; N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 24, § 2; OR. CONST.
XVII, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 2; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 2; WASH.
CONST. art. XXIII, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 2; WYO. CONST.
art. 20, § 3. Although nine states (Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont) do not include express provisions regarding a convention, even these states accept that the legislature may call a convention subject to voter approval. See DINAN, supra note 44, at 21.
104. New Hampshire adopted the device in 1792 and was followed by New York (1846),
Michigan (1850), Maryland (1851), Ohio (1851), Iowa (1857), Oklahoma (1907), Missouri
(1920), Hawaii (1959), Alaska (1959), Connecticut (1965), Illinois (1971), Montana (1972), and
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constitutional amendments in all states, and in forty-one states, a majority
vote by the electorate in favor of a legislative amendment suffices for ratification. 105 Finally, as noted above, eighteen states recognize the constitutional
initiative, which allows the people to propose and ratify amendments without the legislature. 106
C. Democratic Commitments
It is no accident that state constitutions share numerous provisions concerning popular self-government; they have been drafted and refined in service of rule by the people. The frequency of constitutional amendment and
even outright replacement is itself testament to the democratic principle, and
the particular changes the people have adopted—from facilitating constitutional amendment to embracing initiatives to imposing constraints on special legislation—reflect an ongoing project to improve state democracy. This
section places discrete provisions in context by considering the broader
structure and history of state constitutions. 107 We focus on the three features
that together compose the democracy principle: popular sovereignty, majori-

Rhode Island (1973). N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 100; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; MICH. CONST. art.
XII, § 3; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3; IOWA CONST. art. X, § 3; OKLA.
CONST. art. 24, § 2; MO. CONST. art. XII, § 3(a); HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; ALASKA CONST.
art. XIII, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 3; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2. In addition, four states—Florida, Montana, North Dakota, and
South Dakota—allow citizens to bypass the legislature by placing a convention question directly on the ballot. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1. See DINAN, supra note 44, at 21.
105. ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 284; ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI,
§ 1; ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4; CONN. CONST. art. XII; HAW.
CONST. art. XVII, §§ 2–3; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 16, § 1; KAN. CONST.
art. 14, § 1; KY. CONST. § 256; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(C); ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MD. CONST.
art. XIV, § 1; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, ch. 4, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. 15, § 273; MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b); MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; NEB. CONST.
art. XVI, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. IX, para. 1, 6; N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX,
§ 1; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1; OKLA.
CONST. art. 24, § 1; OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1, 3; TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 72; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art.
XIV, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 20, § 1. Four states require a supermajority vote, five require a majority of votes cast on any question in the election, one (Illinois) allows
either of these two methods, and one (Delaware) does not require voter ratification of legislature-generated amendments. COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 5; MINN.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 100; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. II; IOWA CONST.
art. X, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 16, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; ILL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
106. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
107. Our account is necessarily simplified; much more could be said about each of the
developments we canvass below (as well as many we do not take up). Indeed, much more has
been said. Book-length treatments of certain developments we discuss here include DINAN,
supra note 18; FRITZ, supra note 18; and TARR, supra note 31.
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ty rule, and political equality. Although these features are closely intertwined
and ultimately inseparable, we parse them for analytic purposes.
First, popular sovereignty is a defining principle of state constitutions. 108
State constitutions begin with express commitments to popular self-rule, and
over time they have incorporated more mechanisms for its expression, from
constitutional conventions to constitutional initiatives to subconstitutional
direct democracy. State constitutions also seek to reconcile popular sovereignty with representative democracy. In guaranteeing a right to vote, requiring popular election of numerous government actors, limiting terms of
office, and parsing responsibilities among government actors, these constitutions place the people themselves above government. The recognition of
popular sovereignty not as a memory of the distant past or an invented tradition but rather as a present structural commitment is critical to understanding state constitutions. 109
Second, state constitutions embrace majority rule as the best approximation of popular will. From the earliest days, these constitutions have recognized “a majority of the community” 110 as the source of government power,
and they continue to provide for the popular majority to ratify constitutional
amendments, to adopt initiatives and referenda, and to choose elected officials. For constitutional change, direct democracy, and representative government alike, state constitutions cast the majority as the voice of the people
and understand majority rule to be the basis of legitimate government.
Third, and closely related, state constitutions propose political equality
as a necessary condition for majority rule. These constitutions reflect a belief
that the primary threat to democracy is “minority faction—power wielded by
the wealthy or well-connected few—rather than majority faction.” 111 To respond to this threat, state constitutional provisions governing participation
in elections and direct democracy attempt to make government accessible to
all members of the political community. Meanwhile, state constitutional
provisions guaranteeing equality, prohibiting special legislation, and imposing public-purpose requirements seek to foreclose forms of special treatment
by the government.
This is an incomplete picture: even as they have endorsed majority rule
by equal members of the political community, state constitutions have often
understood that community in narrow, exclusionary terms. The racism inscribed in state constitutions is a particularly abhorrent part of the historical
tradition, which is also marred by xenophobia, misogyny, and other discrim-

108. See generally LAURA J. SCALIA, AMERICA’S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT 156 (1999)
(“State constitutions . . . have always tipped the scales in favor of popular sovereignty.”).
109. See generally Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. 1977) (describing state constitutions as “the voice of the people”).
110. See, e.g., VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. 3.
111. G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition,
in DEMOCRACY: HOW DIRECT? 87, 89 (Elliott Abrams ed., 2002).
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inatory understandings. 112 The expansion of the political community, figured among other things in near-universal adult suffrage, is thus critical to
the democratic commitment we explore here. But if state endorsements of
popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality long predated any
meaningful realization of these principles, the early, partial embrace of democracy underlay a fuller realization and should continue to do so.
1.

Popular Sovereignty

The clearest and most longstanding commitment of state constitutions
is to popular sovereignty. In both express statements of the people’s power
and the establishment of channels for constitutional revision, state constitutions facilitate constitutional self-rule. Further, numerous state constitutions
establish direct democracy as a path for popular self-rule in a subconstitutional register, and still more model representative democracy on direct democracy through mechanisms intended to keep government officials directly
accountable to the people.
Constitutional Change. Although only two of the twenty-eight state constitutions adopted in the eighteenth century were formally sent to the people
for ratification, 113 all of the original constitutions declared that the people
were sovereign and the source of government power. 114 For example, Virginia’s 1776 Constitution stated that “all power is vested in, and consequently
derived from, the people” and that “whenever any government shall be
found inadequate or contrary to [producing the greatest degree of happiness
and safety], a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall
be judged most conducive to the publick weal.” 115 Some states followed Virginia’s language quite closely, 116 while others employed different formula-

112. See infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text.
113. The two were the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784. See Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, PUBLIUS,
Winter 1982, at 27, 35 & n.9. Other state constitutions of this era were informally submitted for
popular approval. See WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 24 (1910).
114. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 477 (1994) (“[W]hen we closely examine the various
bills of rights and declarations of rights issuing from the states between 1776 and 1790, we will
see a dramatic pattern: Each state had explicitly endorsed at least one statement—and in many
cases several—that established popular sovereignty as that state’s legal cornerstone.”).
115. VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, arts. 2, 3.
116. E.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, arts. IV, V (“That all power being
originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people . . . . the community hath an
indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in such
manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the public weal.”).
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tions. 117 But in one form or another, all thirteen states emphasized popular
sovereignty as the foundation of government. 118
As the example of Virginia suggests, popular sovereignty was closely
linked to the people’s right to change their constitutions. Even in states
without explicit “alter or abolish” language, the people’s right to change their
fundamental law was widely assumed. 119 Since the eighteenth century, constitutional amendment has been among the most prominent instantiations
of popular sovereignty. The vast majority of states have held multiple constitutional conventions, and state constitutions have collectively been amended
more than 7,500 times, through both legislative amendments ratified by voters and amendments proposed directly by the people. 120
The nineteenth century was a particularly fertile time for constitutional
revision. Across the century, all but three extant states entirely replaced their
constitutions, and new states entering the Union adopted constitutions that
reconsidered and supplemented previous attempts to guarantee popular selfrule. 121 Constitutional conventions mirrored state populations more closely
than legislatures; participants “were not professional politicians.” 122 Moreover, state ratification procedures generally put the convention’s proposal directly to a vote of the people rather than seek approval from
intermediaries. 123 A number of states also expressly created an extralegislative route to facilitate constitutional conventions: every set number of

117. E.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, arts. I, IV (“That all government of
right originates from the people . . . . [That] whenever the ends of government are perverted,
and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the
people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or establish a new government.”).
118. CONN. CONST. of 1818, pmbl.; DEL. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, §§ 1, 4, 5;
GA. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.; MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, arts. IV, V, VII; N.C. CONST. of
1776, declaration of rights, § 1; N.H. CONST. of 1784, bill of rights, arts. I, VII, VIII, X; N.J.
CONST. of 1776, pmbl.; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. & art. I; R.I. CONST. of 1842, pmbl.; S.C.
CONST. of 1776, pmbl. Many states trimmed lengthy proclamations when they revised their
constitutions and “no longer needed to justify the creation of governments.” TARR, supra note
31, at 68–69.
119. See TARR, supra note 31, at 74; FRITZ, supra note 18, at 4; Amar, supra note 114, at
481.
120. DINAN, supra note 44, at 12–13, 19–20.
121. Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia replaced their eighteenth-century constitutions, while Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont did not. See COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2019, at 5 tbl.1.3 (2019), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc
/system/files/1.3.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN2U-S6ZW]. For some of the attempts to better
implement popular self-rule, see infra text accompanying notes 126 & 142–154.
122. Tarr, supra note 111, at 95; see Christian G. Fritz, Rethinking the American Constitutional Tradition: National Dimensions in the Formation of State Constitutions, 26 RUTGERS L.J.
969, 974 (1995) (book review).
123. Tarr, supra note 111, at 96.
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years (often twenty), the question of whether to hold a constitutional convention would be directly submitted to the voters. 124
At constitutional conventions, delegates were not skittish about amending state foundational documents. Conceiving of constitutions as ongoing
projects, they sought to capitalize on the “progress” that had been made
since original constitutions were drafted. 125 In the nineteenth century, states
also increasingly began to provide for amendment outside conventions. All
but one state to hold a convention between 1820 and 1842 introduced a provision for amendment if it did not already possess one. 126
In later years, states adopted still more means by which the people could
change their fundamental law. In particular, in the early twentieth century,
they began to embrace the constitutional initiative, which allows the people
to propose and ratify amendments without the legislature. 127 During the
Progressive Era, thirteen states adopted the constitutional initiative, and five
additional states did so in the wake of the Reapportionment Revolution, in
part based on arguments that it would enable reform where legislators’ selfinterest prevented them from governing for the public good. 128 Partially replacing the convention, the initiative came to serve as the twentieth century’s
“preferred mechanism for ensuring that government reflect the popular
will.” 129
Direct Democracy. During the early twentieth century, direct democracy
also blossomed beyond constitutional amendment. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Lord Bryce saw in Americans “an unmistakable wish in the
minds of the people to act directly rather than through their representatives
in legislation.” 130 The mechanisms by which they came to do so were the initiative and referendum, which 40 percent of the states had adopted by
1918. 131 At constitutional conventions across the country, delegates emphasized the unrepresentative character of their ostensibly representative governments and advocated direct democracy as an antidote. In Massachusetts,
for instance, delegate George Anderson insisted it was inaccurate to say the
choice was between “pure democracy—government directly by the people,—
and representative government. The question is between representative gov-

124. Today, fourteen states have a periodic convention call. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
125. Fritz, supra note 37, at 974 (quoting delegates to nineteenth-century constitutional
conventions).
126. FRITZ, supra note 18, at 242. Virginia was the lone exception. Id. at 243.
127. DINAN, supra note 18, at 59.
128. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 60, 62.
129. Tarr, supra note 111, at 97.
130. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 42 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1888).
131. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 94 (citing RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS:
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 39 (2002)).
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ernment and unrepresentative government.” 132 In Michigan, George Horton
complained that “[t]he history of legislatures for the recent past decades is
prolific with disregard for the prayers of the people.” 133 The initiative and
referenda were proposed as correctives to misrepresentation, ways of bringing states’ “whole fabric of government into larger ful[l]ness in accord with
that great foundation principle that all just governments among men derive
their power from the consent of the governed. A carrying out of that principle to meet the changed conditions.” 134
The embrace of direct democracy thus reflected an attempt to ensure
self-government at a subconstitutional level. Popular initiatives became
more widespread across the twentieth century, as additional states embraced
direct democracy. Since 1904, when Oregon saw the first ballot initiative,
more than two thousand initiatives have been considered, and nearly half
have been approved. 135 Certain periods (such as the Progressive Era and
1990s and 2000s) have seen more initiatives than others, and certain states
(especially in the West) have seen more initiatives than others, but initiatives
have been a part of state governance across the country. 136
Representation. The commitment to popular sovereignty has also informed the ways state constitutions create and constrain government offices.
Over time, state constitutions have increased the number of elected offices
and shifted power among government actors in an effort to ensure greater
responsiveness. They have also introduced numerous accountability mechanisms, from legislative publication requirements to single-subject rules, to
make government action more readily monitored by the public.
The first state constitutions envisioned the legislature as the closest approximation of the people. Reacting in part against monarchy, these constitutions provided for weak governors and strong legislatures, 137 seeking “to
approximate direct democracy in their systems of representative government.” 138 They also adopted institutional mechanisms that would reinforce
legislators’ connection to the people, such as small districts, rotation in office, and annual elections for the lower house. 139 Although colonial assem-

132. 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917-1918, at
273 (1918) (emphasis omitted).
133. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF MICHIGAN 560 (1907).
134. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION;
DECEMBER, 1902, at 784 (1903) (Delegate George Clyde).
135. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., INITIATIVE USE (2019), http://www.iandrinstitute
.org/docs/IRI-Initiative-Use-(2019-2).pdf [https://perma.cc/9L6B-TYF9].
136. Nearly half the states have recognized at least one initiative. Id.
137. Gordon S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 914–16 (1993).
138. Tarr, supra note 111, at 91.
139. Id. at 92; see TARR, supra note 31, at 82–83. Originally, South Carolina did not have
annual elections, but it adopted them in 1778. By 1789, seven states also had annual elections
for their upper houses. Id. at 83.
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blies had generally deliberated in private to ensure independence, a number
of eighteenth-century state constitutions further required legislatures to publish their votes and proceedings. 140 And they also expressly or impliedly included a right of the people to instruct their representatives. 141
By the early nineteenth century, concerns that legislatures were not
faithful representatives of the people had grown acute, and state reformers
adopted a new round of constitutional provisions that sought to check the
legislature in the service of greater popular accountability. 142 Most states
added constitutional provisions limiting state legislative processes “in response to perceived state legislative abuses [such as l]ast-minute consideration of important measures; logrolling; mixing substantive provisions in
omnibus bills; low visibility; and hasty enactment of important, and sometimes corrupt, legislation; and the attachment of unrelated provisions to bills
in the amendment process.” 143 The point of these procedural requirements
was not to limit government power as such; instead, it was to ensure that
government was working for the people, “limiting government’s discretion
without limiting its scope.” 144
States also enhanced the connections between the people and other government actors. During the eighteenth century when fears of monarchy were
paramount, it was common for state constitutions to provide that governors
be selected by legislatures. 145 But in the nineteenth century, every state entering the Union chose to popularly elect the governor, and all existing states
but South Carolina revised their constitutions to provide for popular election. 146 The vast majority of state constitutions also began to provide for
popular election of other executive officials, including secretaries of state,
treasurers, attorneys general, and auditors. 147 Elected judiciaries became the
norm as well: after Mississippi adopted an entirely elective judiciary in 1832,
every state entering the United States in the second half of the nineteenth
century popularly elected its judges, and in short order a majority of states so
provided. 148 At the Wisconsin Constitutional Convention of 1846, the Judi-

140. Id. at 79. The “radical” Pennsylvania Constitution contemplated that a new assembly
would be elected before a law came into effect, so that the people could effectively vote on legislation. See id. at 83; STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM
171 (1968) (describing this as “bicameralism from below”).
141. E.g., MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. XIX; see TARR, supra note 31, at 84; see
also EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 212–13 (1988) (discussing instruction of
representatives in the colonies).
142. See Tarr, supra note 111, at 85–94.
143. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 258.
144. ZACKIN, supra note 21, at 33 (cleaned up) (discussing the detailed nature of state
constitutional provisions).
145. TARR, supra note 31, at 83.
146. Id. at 121.
147. Id. at 121–22.
148. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716–17 (1995); LARRY C. BERKSON, UPDATED BY RACHEL
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ciary Committee reported that judges as well as legislatures and executives
should be selected in accordance with “an axiom of government in this
country, that the people are the source of all political power, and to them
should their officers and rulers be responsible for the faithful discharge of
their respective duties.” 149
As Tarr has explained, “the state reforms were primarily concerned with
preventing faithless legislators from frustrating the popular will.” 150 The direct election of executive officials and judges was key: “Popular election not
only ensured accountability but also allowed executive officials and judges to
claim that they had just as strong a connection to the people, the source of all
political authority, as did legislators.” 151 This claim was particularly important to the adoption of the gubernatorial veto, which most states embraced in the nineteenth century. 152 It also carried into the twentieth century.
For example, Progressive-Era constitutional convention delegates argued
that legislators were more likely than governors to be captured by special interests, and they increased the role of the governor in the legislative process
through such mechanisms as the line-item veto. 153 Convention delegates
likewise sought to make elected judiciaries more responsive to the people, for
instance by adopting recall provisions. 154
During subsequent waves of reform, popular initiatives imposed other
restraints intended to ensure popular responsiveness, such as term limits
that were widely adopted at the end of the twentieth century. 155 In recalibrating power among government actors and providing for direct popular overCAUFIELD & MALIA REDDICK, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Berkson_1196091951709.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N4ZQ-A453] (“By the time of the Civil War, 24 of 34 states had established an elected judiciary . . . .”).
149. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
WISCONSIN: BEGUN AND HELD AT MADISON, ON THE FIFTH DAY OF OCTOBER, ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX 106–08 (Madison, Beriah Brown 1847) (report
of the judiciary committee); see Croley, supra note 148, at 722 (“The philosophical justifications for elective judiciaries seem to have been limited largely to invocations of democratic
principles . . . .”).
150. Tarr, supra note 111, at 94.
151. Id.
152. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 112–13.
153. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 122–23; John A. Fairlie, The Veto Power of the State
Governor, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473 (1917); see, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 568 (1912) [hereinafter OHIO 1912
DEBATES] (Prof. George W. Knight) (noting that the veto “has in the main been exercised in
the interest of the people”).
154. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 135.
155. See The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx
[https://perma.cc/95CG-W6MV] (documenting adoption of term limits in fifteen states by
initiative between 1990 and 2000). In the midst of this initiative effort, the Supreme Court invalidated state attempts to impose term limits on federal representatives in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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sight of government action, state constitutions have sought to make popular
sovereignty a lived feature of representative as well as direct democracy.
2.

Majority Rule

To implement the commitment to popular sovereignty, state constitutions generally understand a majority to speak for the people. They provide
for constitutional amendment by majorities, they contemplate that initiatives
and referenda will be adopted by popular majorities, and they provide for
representative government to be constituted by those receiving the highest
number of votes. Although there are important exceptions, state constitutions overwhelmingly favor the majority as the best approximation of the
people themselves. Their frameworks for representative and direct democracy alike contemplate that the preference of the majority will prevail when
there is political disagreement.
Constitutions. The earliest state constitutions closely connected popular
sovereignty to majority rule. In declaring that all government power was derived from the people, Virginia’s 1776 Constitution expressly noted that “a
majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged
most conductive to the publick weal.” 156 Although other state constitutions
did not make the connection so explicitly, the necessary relationship between the two was widely understood: “Both as a general default rule in the
absence of specific language to the contrary, and as a specific corollary of
popular sovereignty, [majority rule] literally went without saying in a variety
of declarations precisely because it was so obvious.” 157
Notwithstanding proclamations of a right to “alter or abolish” in the earliest state constitutions, the institutional mechanisms for exercising this right
were unsettled in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 158 Although state constitutions that addressed the question generally required legislatures to propose a constitutional convention, 159 the early nineteenth
century was rife not only with conventions called by legislatures (sometimes
succumbing reluctantly to popular pressure 160) but also with extralegal conventions during which the people insisted on the popular majority’s right to
change the constitution without specific legislative permission. Most famously Thomas Dorr in Rhode Island, but also Americans across all thenextant states, insisted on “a right of a majority to change government in the
156. VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § 3.
157. Amar, supra note 114, at 482; see also id. (“In the 1780s the special status of majority
rule was extraordinarily well understood.”).
158. See Fritz, supra note 37, at 989.
159. See Tarr, supra note 111, at 95; see generally Fritz, supra, note 37, at 989–90.
160. This occurred in Virginia in 1829 and Mississippi in 1832. See A.E. Dick Howard,
“For the Common Benefit”: Constitutional History in Virginia as a Casebook for the Modern
Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REV. 816, 847 (1968); David G. Sansing, Mississippi’s Four Constitutions, 56 MISS. L.J. 3, 7 (1986).
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exercise of that political sovereignty which the majority of [the] community
embodies.” 161 During this period, numerous states adopted new constitutions through majoritarian proceedings despite provisions in their constitutions specifying revision through other mechanisms. 162
As states in the early nineteenth century began to provide for constitutional amendment outside conventions, moreover, the generally accepted
principle was “that the people’s sovereignty—expressed by a majority—
remained the ultimate constitutional authority.” 163 Over the course of the
nineteenth century, procedural bars to the majority’s effectuation of its will
began to disappear in favor of legislative majoritarianism: states gradually
removed requirements including consecutive legislative session approval and
supermajority voting. 164 They also increasingly accepted the ability of popular majorities to ratify constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature. During the nineteenth century, it was common for states to require
approval of legislature-generated amendments by more than a majority (either a supermajority or a majority of all those participating in the election
rather than voting on the particular question), 165 but the clear trend across
the twentieth century was in favor of a majority vote. Today, only four states
have supermajority requirements, and only five have majority-in-theelection requirements. 166 In forty-one states, a majority vote in favor of a legislative amendment is sufficient for ratification. 167
Government. State constitutions also contemplate majoritarianism for
subconstitutional lawmaking. In adopting the initiative and referendum in
the twentieth century, states tended to provide that a majority vote would
suffice to adopt proposals as law. 168 They also infused direct democracy with
majority-rule principles in additional respects—for example, by stating that
if two conflicting measures are approved by the people in the same election,
the rule receiving more votes prevails. 169

161. FRITZ, supra note 18, at 262 (quoting Dorr’s supporters).
162. See id. at 30–31.
163. Id. at 242, 244.
164. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 45; id. (quoting a delegate to the Pennsylvania Convention of 1837–1838 saying “our government is based upon the fundamental principle that the
majority shall govern” and that a supermajority requirement is “in direct opposition to that
fundamental principle”).
165. Id. at 56–57.
166. DINAN, supra note 44, at 13–15. As discussed previously, Illinois permits the supermajority approach as one of two methods. See supra note 105.
167. Id. Delaware does not require voter ratification of legislature-generated amendments. Id.
168. See sources cited supra note 90.
169. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(12) (“If two or more conflicting measures or
amendments to the constitution shall be approved by the people at the same election, the
measure or amendment receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes shall prevail in all
particulars as to which there is conflict.”).

March 2021]

The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions

889

State constitutions likewise widely provide for a popular majority to select state government. From the start, the goal of approximating direct democracy in their representative legislatures led eighteenth-century state conconstitutions to embrace majoritarianism. Most notably, the Pennsylvania
Constitution apportioned the legislature based on the number of taxable inhabitants because this was deemed “the only principle which can . . . make
the voice of a majority of the people the law of the land.” 170 Other constitutions similarly provided that state legislators should be elected by majorities. 171 Nineteenth-century reformers increasingly “argued that majority rule
and voter equality were essential and fundamental rights of freemen,” and
conventions altered schemes of representation and apportionment accordingly. 172 They further recognized that plurality-voting rules might best instantiate majority rule in the case of multiple candidates. As they made
governors, other executive officials, and judges popularly elected, for instance, nineteenth-century constitutions generally provided that the person
receiving the highest number of votes would prevail. 173 Today, all state legislators are selected from districts drawn based on population, 174 and for the
broad range of statewide offices—not only state governors, but also judges
and other executive branch officials, from attorneys general to secretaries of
state—the nearly universal rule is selection of the person receiving the highest number of votes. 175
Within governing bodies themselves, moreover, state constitutions provide for majority rule. In outlining legislative procedure, for instance, many
state constitutions state that bills must receive a majority vote in each house
to become law, prohibiting a minority from enacting legislation. 176 State constitutions not only seek to create representative governments directly tethered to popular majorities but also to ensure that the majority prevails within
such institutions.

170. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 17.
171. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 2, arts. III, IV.
172. SCALIA, supra note 108, at 63; see, e.g., id. at 67 (quoting a delegate to the Virginia
convention arguing that the “essential character of a free Government” was majority rule). See
generally DINAN, supra note 44, at 65 (describing more equitable apportionment plans adopted
in nineteenth-century conventions). But see infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive understandings of the political community).
173. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV (“[T]he person having the highest number
of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected.”); see Sanford & Gillies, supra note 62, at
787–88.
174. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text (noting state constitutional revision
based on the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment doctrine).
175. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Political Equality

Together with their commitments to popular sovereignty and majority
rule, state constitutions also embrace a commitment to political equality, a
commitment that entails both equal access to political institutions by members of the political community and equal treatment of members of the political community by those institutions in turn. Responding to a fear that the
privileged few may capture government at the expense of the many—and
that “[m]inority faction, not majority faction, pose[s] the greatest danger” 177—provisions governing participation in elections and direct democracy attempt to make government accessible to all members of the political
community. At the same time, provisions guaranteeing equality, prohibiting
special legislation, and imposing public-purpose requirements attempt to
foreclose special treatment for the privileged few.
Inputs. From the beginning, state constitutions declared a commitment
to political equality among the limited group of people understood to be
members of the political community. Eighteenth-century declarations of
rights spoke of equal participation in shaping representative government.
For example, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 called for “equal” elections
with participation by “all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent
common interest with, and attachment to, the community.” 178 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly provided that the representation of
the people in the legislature was to be “founded upon the principle of equality” 179 and further stated, “All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish
by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and to be
elected, for public employments.” 180
As some of these early provisions themselves indicated, the political
community was understood quite narrowly. Over time, the story has undeniably been one of progressive inclusion—but this progress has been marred
by periods of sharp retrenchment. For example, during the Jacksonian era,
an emphasis on popular rule and the “common man” led to the end of property and religious qualifications for white men but also wider disenfranchisement of people of color. 181 At the Pennsylvania Constitutional
Convention of 1837–1838, which was called to extend suffrage, Black Pennsylvanians were stripped of their right to vote through an amendment limit-

177. TARR, supra note 31, at 78.
178. VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § 6; see also, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776,
declaration of rights, art. 6 (“That the right in the people to participate in the legislature is the
foundation of liberty and of all free government, and for this end all elections ought to be free
and frequent, and every freeman, having sufficient evidence of a permanent common interest
with, and attachment to the community, hath a right of suffrage.”).
179. MASS. CONST pt. 2, ch. I, § 3, arts. I, II.
180. MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. IX.
181. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 31, at 105–06.
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ing the franchise to “white freem[e]n.” 182 Decades later, the period following
the Civil War marked an expansion of suffrage, but the advances of Reconstruction quickly yielded to the racial terror of Redemption. Southern states
adopted literacy tests, poll taxes, and other exclusionary mechanisms—
coupled with grandfather clauses for white men—to deny Black Americans
the vote. 183 In its 1890 constitution, for example, Mississippi imposed a poll
tax and required electors to “be able to read any section of the constitution of
this State” or “be able to understand the same when read to him, or give a
reasonable interpretation thereof.” 184 Former Confederate states followed the
“Mississippi plan” and codified disenfranchisement in their constitutions. 185
In other regions of the country, immigrants and ethnic minorities were excluded from constitutional understandings of the political community. 186
Only after the invalidation of the poll tax in 1964 and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 did political equality become even an ostensibly full state constitutional commitment—and one that
still has yet to be realized in practice. 187 But if the principle of political
equality has been radically incomplete throughout American history, its articulation from the start as an aspiration of state constitutions has underwrit-

182. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1; see ROBERT PURVIS, APPEAL OF FORTY THOUSAND
CITIZENS, THREATENED WITH DISFRANCHISEMENT, TO THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, Merrihew & Gunn 1838).
183. See generally EDWARD L. GIBSON, BOUNDARY CONTROL 35–71 (2012); ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 83–89 (rev. ed. 2009); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS (1974); ROBERT MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE 33–63 (2015); MICHAEL
PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY (2001).
184. MISS. CONST. art. 12, §§ 243–244 (repealed 1975); see Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to these provisions because
“[t]hey do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that
their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them”).
185. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 178–195 (repealed 1996); GA. CONST. of 1877, art.
II (1908); LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 197, §§ 3–4; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 4; S.C. CONST. of 1895,
art. II, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. II, § 20.
186. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (repealed 1972) (disenfranchising Chinese residents
from 1879 to 1943, when they became eligible for naturalization); IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3
(amended 1962) (disenfranchising Chinese and Mormon residents); KEYSSAR, supra note 183,
at 94–138.
187. Despite the constitutional commitment to full enfranchisement, state measures suppressing the vote of citizens of color remain pervasive. For example, numerous states have
adopted strict photo ID requirements, they have made voter registration more difficult, and
they have cut back on polling locations and hours. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NEW VOTING
RESTRICTIONS IN AMERICA (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201911/New%20Voting%20Restrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KWH-V7LY]; Voter Identification
Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/8X45WGLC]. Moreover, forty-eight states disenfranchise citizens convicted of felony offenses, and
twenty-eight of these states continue to do so following prison, parole, and probation—a practice that has wildly disproportionate effects on citizens of color. Jean Chung, Felon Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENT’G PROJECT (June 27, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org
/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/TE38-NZ8W].
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ten more inclusive understandings and continues to provide a measure by
which to judge state government.
Today, the state constitutional commitment to political equality in constituting government is reflected especially in provisions that expressly confer the right to vote and that guarantee “free and equal elections.” It is also
found in the requirement imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment that legislative districts must be apportioned based on population and
more particular state guarantees of “equal representation in the government.” 188
Outputs. The idea that members of the political community have an
equal say in governance has been closely linked to the idea that government
must work for the people as a whole. For example, the same eighteenthcentury declarations of rights that insisted all government power flows from
the people further “invariably identified promoting the common good as the
principal aspiration of American republics.” 189 Maryland’s 1776 Constitution
stated that government was created “solely for the good of the whole,” for
instance, while South Carolina’s 1776 Constitution stated that governments
were created for “the good of the people,” and Georgia’s 1777 Constitution
provided that it was “the people” for “whose benefit all government is intended.” 190 As a corollary to the idea that the common good was the end of
government, many state declarations of rights also condemned special
treatment of individuals and classes. For example, Massachusetts’s Constitution of 1780 provided that “[g]overnment is instituted for the common good;
for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not
for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men,” 191 while Virginia’s 1776 Constitution indicated that “no man, or set of
men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community, but in consideration of public services.” 192
The state constitutional commitment to promoting the public good became more pronounced in the nineteenth century, as state constitutional revisions responded to special legislative treatment for the favored few. 193 In

188. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text; see, e.g., W. VA. CONST., art. II, § 4
(“Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in the government, and, in all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved.”).
189. FRITZ, supra note 18, at 18.
190. GA. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.; MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. I; S.C.
CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
191. MASS. CONST. declaration of rights, art. VII; see also, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. 5.
192. VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § 4.
193. Cf. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., Pa.
State Univ. 2002) (1835); 2 JOHN STUART MILL, M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America,
reprinted in DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 1, 7–8 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859)
(“By Democracy M. de Tocqueville understands equality of conditions; the absence of all aristocracy, whether constituted by political privileges, or by superiority in individual importance
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the 1830s, state legislatures rushed into internal improvements and other
costly ventures, financing railroads, canals, and banks and granting significant benefits to these interests, while driving the states themselves into economic crises. 194 At the same time, state legislatures were spending
considerable time and energy—often the vast majority of their time—on
special legislation for particular individuals’ benefit. 195 In response, state
constitutional conventions restricted legislatures from acting in favor of special interests and against the public weal. For example, they adopted mandatory referenda that enabled the people as a whole to “sit upon as a jury” the
legislature’s decision to enter into public improvements, to raise taxes, to
charter banks, and the like. 196 They also adopted the procedural restrictions
described above, such as single-subject and original-purpose rules. 197
In the 1840s and 1850s, numerous states also adopted equality guarantees. 198 Echoing founding-era provisions, Ohio’s 1851 Constitution stated
that “Government is instituted for [the people’s] equal protection and benefit,” 199 while Oregon’s 1859 Constitution more distinctly stated that “[n]o
law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 200 Although state equality provisions have sometimes been understood as comparable to the federal Equal Protection Clause, their distinct
pedigree speaks to a distinct purpose. As the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, while the Reconstruction Congress “was concerned with discrimination against disfavored groups or individuals, specifically, former slaves,”
the drafters of Oregon’s 1857 provision were concerned “with favoritism and
the granting of special privileges for a select few.” 201
Alongside equality provisions and procedural requirements, states also
adopted constitutional prohibitions on legislative enactment of special and

and social power. It is towards Democracy in this sense, towards equality between man and
man, that he conceives society to be irresistibly tending.”).
194. See Long, supra note 80, at 727.
195. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 278 (noting that 90 percent of the laws passed
during Indiana’s 1849–1850 legislative session were special in nature).
196. 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF IOWA 269
(Davenport, Luse, Lane & Co. 1857) (Delegate Amos Harris); see DINAN, supra note 18, at 68–
76.
197. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
198. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1195 (1985).
199. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
200. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
201. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 975 (Or. 1982) (en banc);
OR. CONST. art. I, § 20; see WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 213 (“A provision like Oregon’s . . . does
not seek equal protection of the laws at all. Instead, it prohibits legislative discrimination in favor of a minority.”).
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local laws that applied only to a limited set of persons or localities. 202 The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873 contained forty subject-matter restrictions on the legislature; the Missouri Constitution of 1875 contained fifty-six; and the California Constitution of 1879 contained thirty-three. 203
“Moreover, once a limitation was enshrined in a few constitutions, the interstate borrowing of provisions virtually guaranteed its appearance in others as
well, as constitution-makers sought to avoid granting ‘too lax a discretion to
transient representatives of the people.’ ” 204 The vast majority of state constitutions still contain prohibitions on special legislation. 205 They also include
public-purpose requirements that seek to limit state spending, taxing, and
borrowing so as “to prevent the use of government power to effect private
transfers of economic interests.” 206
Finally, the embrace of direct democracy across the twentieth century
reflected concerns about “interest-dominated legislatures” 207 and a desire to
make laws reflect the common good. Progressive proponents of direct democracy echoed arguments of nineteenth-century reformers: special interests were preventing public-regarding legislation, so the people needed to be
able to govern directly. 208 More recent direct-democracy efforts have targeted forms of legislative self-dealing, by seeking, for instance, to impose limits
on lobbying and campaign finance. 209 Together, these various provisions reflect a constitutional vision that state government must be both “by” the
people and “for” the people. 210
II.

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS

The distinctiveness of the state constitutional commitment to democracy emerges more clearly when considered alongside the federal Constitution.
While state constitutions embrace an active popular sovereign, the federal

202. See, e.g., Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, 27 A. 356, 360 (Pa. 1893) (“It is certainly not
forgotten that the well-nigh unanimous demand which brought the convention of 1873 into
existence was prompted by the evils springing from local and special legislation.”).
203. TARR, supra note 31, at 120.
204. Id. (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, STATE AND FEDERAL 210
n.2 (photo. reprt. 1971) (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co. 1897)).
205. See supra note 80; see also Long, supra note 80, at 721 (noting that courts stopped
enforcing these provisions by the mid-twentieth century).
206. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1324, 1484 (1982); see supra note 84. But see Richard Briffault, Foreword, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909
(2003) (“Judicial interpretations have effectively nullified the public purpose requirements that
ostensibly prevent state and local spending, lending, and borrowing in aid of private endeavors.”).
207. DINAN, supra note 18, at 59–60.
208. See id. at 84–85.
209. See DINAN, supra note 44, at 250–55.
210. TARR, supra note 31, at 100.
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Constitution has placed the popular sovereign in a “coma.” 211 While state
constitutions facilitate majority rule, the federal Constitution thwarts any
straightforward exercise of majority governance. And while state constitutions endorse political equality, the federal Constitution largely rejects it, not
least because of the federal structure itself.
Each of these oppositions is, as we will discuss, more complicated, but
nuance should not distract from the basic point. Whether one describes the
federal Constitution as simply “undemocratic,” as have a number of distinguished commentators, 212 or instead offers interpretations that seek to “reconcile [federal] constitutionalism with democracy,” 213 the federal document
bears a very different relationship to democracy than do state constitutions.
It is wary of unmediated popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political
equality.
Beyond underscoring distinctive aspects of the democracy principle, exploring federal and state constitutions together helps make sense of a broader American constitutionalism. Neither the federal Constitution nor state
constitutions stand alone. Since the eighteenth century, they have been
drafted and amended in response to one another—sometimes to incorporate
the other’s content and sometimes to reject the other’s particular approach.
If they are distinct, so too are state and federal constitutions complementary
in critical respects. While the ways in which the federal Constitution may
temper excesses and abuses of state majoritarianism have been much studied, the ways in which state constitutions may ameliorate national democratic shortcomings, including problems of minority rule, have not received
similar attention.
A. Alternatives
It is unsurprising that state and federal constitutions would bear different relationships to democracy. Drafters of the 1789 U.S. Constitution
were “alarmed by majoritarian tyranny within the states” and responded to
the “excesses” of American democracy they perceived to be reflected in the
first wave of state constitutions. 214 For their part, drafters of state constitutional provisions in the nineteenth century rejected numerous aspects of the
eighteenth-century U.S. Constitution, including Article V’s inhibition of

211. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism,
127 YALE L.J. 664, 687 (2018) (reviewing RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (2016)).
212. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2d ed. 2003); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006); Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987).
213. Jackson, supra note 41, at 1261–62; see, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
(1991); ELY, supra note 5; Amar, supra note 114; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
214. Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONSTITUTION? 1, 9 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
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popular amendment and its rejection of simple majoritarian government. 215
Eschewing Founder-worship, a delegate to the Nevada convention of 1864
noted that the federal Constitution had been adopted when “the Government was yet but an experiment,” 216 while a delegate to the California convention of 1878–1879 more bluntly dismissed the relevance of any
constitution formed in such “primitive times.” 217 These and other state conventions not only exemplified a different approach to democracy involving
continuous revision but also yielded distinct constitutional provisions and
understandings. Designed from the outset in partial opposition to one another, and amended and interpreted through distinct traditions over time,
state and federal constitutions embody different relationships to rule by the
people.
1.

Popular Sovereignty and the Problem of Present Consent

Although both state and federal constitutions express a belief in popular
sovereignty, their understandings and commitments differ markedly. As David Grewal and Jedediah Purdy have argued, “the conception of popular sovereignty underlying a democratic constitution necessarily combines” ideas of
popular authorship and present consent. 218 First, the people must “be said in
a genuine, non-obscurantist way to be the original source of authority for
their own fundamental law.” 219 Second, “what gives fundamental law its authority is the consent of the people now living under it, who constitute the
present sovereign, rather than the fact that it was originally adopted through
an earlier sovereign act.” 220
At the state level, practices of constitutional revision unite popular authorship with continuous present consent: the people who are currently living under the state constitution remain responsible for that constitution and
have a genuine and oft-exercised ability to change it if they no longer endorse its provisions. These constitutions have collectively been replaced and
amended thousands of times, through both legislative amendments ratified
by voters and amendments proposed directly by the people. 221 The popular

215. See generally FRITZ, supra note 18 (describing nineteenth-century state amendments).
216. NEVADA 1864 DEBATES, supra note 32, at 563–64.
217. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28,
1878, at 203 (Sacramento, J.D. Young 1880) (Delegate Clitus Barbour).
218. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 211, at 681–82.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 682.
221. See DINAN, supra note 44, at 23; supra Part I.
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sovereign has remained, by design and practice alike, at least intermittently
awake. 222
In contrast, although the federal Constitution likewise begins with a
proclamation of popular sovereignty, it “calls ‘We the People’ into being only
to constrain sharply the same people’s capacity for ongoing constitutional
self-rule.” 223 Article V provides the only explicit path to amendment: proposal of an amendment by two-thirds of both houses of Congress or proposal of a convention by two-thirds of the state legislatures, and ratification
by three-fourths of the states through their legislatures or conventions. 224
Amending the federal Constitution is accordingly exceedingly difficult; only
seventeen amendments have been adopted since the 1791 Bill of Rights, and
only one of those (the repeal of Prohibition) by anything other than congressional proposal and state legislative ratification. 225 None of the twenty-seven
amendments that have been adopted over 230 years has been proposed by a
convention. 226
The difficulty of amendment has not convinced Americans—or, more
specifically, judges, lawyers, and scholars—that popular sovereignty does not
exist as a matter of federal constitutional law. But the various responses that
valorize “We the People” necessarily adopt a different understanding of and
approach to popular sovereignty than do state constitutions.
Presenting perhaps the starkest contrast, one response focuses solely on
popular authorship: the federal Constitution was adopted by the people, so
its provisions instantiate popular sovereignty, however long they have been
in effect and however little we know about whether the now-living people
approve. 227 Although this approach, most prominently associated with
originalism, may suggest that the absence of constitutional amendment indicates present consent, Article V constraints reveal the stark limits of such a
claim. At a minimum, the absence of amendment cannot indicate consent by
anything close to a popular majority. 228 The originalist conception of popular sovereignty necessarily privileges the past over the present. Insofar as it
equates dead-hand control with popular sovereignty, it poses the clearest
contrast to state constitutions, which privilege ongoing, present consent.
A different approach to popular sovereignty and the federal Constitution focuses on the present community instead of accepting dead-hand con222. See generally SCALIA, supra note 108 (exploring popular sovereignty in the state constitutional tradition); RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (2016) (tracing the historical
distinction between sovereignty and government).
223. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 211, at 681.
224. U.S. CONST. art. V.
225. Prohibition was repealed by state conventions. Thomas F. Schaller, Democracy at
Rest: Strategic Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, PUBLIUS, Spring 1998, at 81, 81; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
226. Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov
/federal-register/constitution [https://perma.cc/TL9H-2RTP].
227. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 211, at 681–82.
228. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing majority rule).
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trol. 229 Yet whereas the living sovereign may speak at the state level by
amending the constitution itself, Article V all but precludes that at the federal level. Because there is no other recognized mechanism of constitutional
amendment, struggles over how the living sovereign speaks and who may
decipher its speech are unavoidable. Akhil Amar, for instance, has argued
that “We the People of the United States have a legal right to alter our Government—to change our Constitution—via a majoritarian and populist
mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that mechanism is
not explicitly specified in Article V.” 230 The implausibility of such a process
highlights just how removed the federal constitutional tradition is from state
practices of popular sovereign control.
Other accounts look to interpretation rather than amendment as such.
For example, the sort of popular constitutionalism embraced by Larry Kramer, democratic constitutionalism embraced by Robert Post and Reva Siegel,
and living originalism embraced by Jack Balkin posit channels, including social and political movements, through which the people express understandings of an inherited foundational document that make it “our own.” 231 As an
initial matter, this approach is limited as compared to constitutional
amendment; only a subset of provisions are understood to admit of meaningful interpretation, and specific text forecloses some conceptions of fundamental law that might better accord with popular sentiment. 232 Some
amount of dead-hand control is inescapable. Even where there is more interpretive room, moreover, there is no agreed-upon way in which “We the
People” speak and are heard. Absent amendment, it is left to government actors to decide what the people have willed. 233
In contrast, the constitutionally specified state processes of popular approval and revision enable the people to speak for themselves, and they have
done so time and again. To be sure, there may be any number of practical
impediments (not to mention any number of normative objections) to their
revisions, but the constitutional distinction remains critical: state constitutions allow the people to speak for themselves, and yoke popular authorship
to present consent, in ways the federal Constitution does not.

229. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 211, at 682.
230. Amar, supra note 114, at 457. But see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996) (disputing
Amar’s account).
231. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 62–63, 71 (2011); see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7–8 (2004); Post
& Siegel, supra note 213, at 374.
232. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 246–54 (new ed. 2011) (describing the “Constitution of Settlement”).
233. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 211, at 691 (“[C]ompeting official interpreters . . . make clashing appeals to a ‘people’ that cannot speak for itself.”).
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Majority Rule and the Question of Mediation

The federal Constitution’s relative privileging of the past over the present is closely related to the distinct ways in which state and federal constitutions conceive of majority rule. In brief, state constitutions endorse simple,
unmediated expressions of majority will, while the federal Constitution rejects any such approach.
State constitutions embrace the authority of current popular majorities
with respect to both sovereign acts and governmental ones. State constitutional ratification and amendment tends to occur through relatively simple
majoritarian decisionmaking insofar as a popular majority speaks for the
people. With respect to subconstitutional lawmaking as well, state constitutions privilege decisions of popular majorities. These majorities may themselves adopt laws, through processes of direct democracy, and they are
responsible for constituting government, through statewide popular voting
for governors, other executive officials, and judges; state constitutions have
no equivalent of the Senate or the Electoral College, and all but one have rejected life tenure for judges. 234 Even where state constitutions favor representative over direct democracy, then, they remain skeptical of mediated
government and locate the majority of the political community as the principal and normatively superior decisionmaker.
The federal Constitution disavows both simple majority rule and unmediated governance. Most starkly, there is nothing akin to a national initiative
or referendum process. As Michael Klarman has noted, “despite the Framers’ regular professions of devotion to popular sovereignty, their deep distrust of the people was evident . . . in nearly every substantive choice made in
the Constitution that bore on the new federal government’s susceptibility to
popular influence.” 235 Publius famously celebrated the “total exclusion of the
people in their collective capacity” as the most distinctive feature of extant
American governments, and one that would be inscribed in the federal document. 236 The people would act exclusively, and not only partially, through
representatives. There has been no introduction of direct democracy for federal lawmaking in the centuries since. When national reform swept the
country during the Progressive Era, for instance, it was only written into
state constitutions. President Teddy Roosevelt, among others, announced
himself “emphatically a believer in constitutionalism” while “protest[ing]
against any theory that would make of the constitution a means of thwarting
instead of securing the absolute right of the people to rule themselves and to
provide for their own social and industrial well-being.” 237 Yet his advocacy
for more flexible amendment procedures and popular rule focused on state

234. Rhode Island grants life tenure. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
235. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP 608 (2016).
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 355 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis omitted).
237. OHIO 1912 DEBATES, supra note 153, at 378–79.
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constitutions, not the federal one; his comments were made to the Ohio
Constitutional Convention of 1912. 238
With respect to representative government, too, the federal Constitution
favors heavily mediated approaches to lawmaking, in part to limit expressions of majority will in the manner state constitutions embrace. Notwithstanding proclaimed commitments at the constitutional convention, the
Framers’ “stress on majoritarianism . . . sat awkwardly with the actual shape
of the Constitution, as it had emerged from the compromises of Philadelphia.” 239 A number of “strong anti-majoritarian features” have been hardwired
into the federal Constitution from the start. 240 These provisions—most notably the structure of the Senate, the Electoral College, and the guarantee of life
tenure for Article III judges—“construct a barrier to majority rule at the national level.” 241 And even as these provisions have become still-more “antimajoritarian” in their effects over time given changes in population, they
have not been changed, at least in part because of Article V’s own requirement of double supermajorities to alter the Constitution. “The dreadful fact,”
Sandy Levinson concludes, “is that none of the great institutions of American politics can plausibly claim to speak for the majority of Americans.” 242
Others dispute Levinson’s contention that “majority rule is significantly
stymied by the operation of the Constitution itself.” 243 For example, some
suggest that individually antimajoritarian institutions may offset one another
to foster a reasonably majoritarian system overall. 244 Some focus on additional entry points, such as ways in which social movements representing
popular majorities shape government decisionmaking. 245 Some define majority rule in terms of views reached after deliberation by informed representatives and argue that the federal Constitution fosters such a deliberative
majority. 246 And a large number take issue with temporally bounded or uni-

238. Id. at 379.
239. TUCK, supra note 222, at 231; see id. at 229–31 (quoting statements from the constitutional convention and noting that “it was the state constitutions rather than the federal one
that most closely corresponded to the political convictions of the Americans”). See generally
KLARMAN, supra note 235, at 606–09 (emphasizing the federal document’s “[h]ostility
[t]oward [d]emocracy”). For the classic, much-disputed statement, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 188 (1913) (arguing that the Founders designed the Constitution to protect their own property interests).
240. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989).
241. DAHL, supra note 212, at 47, 48, 55, 76–77.
242. LEVINSON, supra note 212, at 49.
243. Id. at 77.
244. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (2009).
245. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009).
246. See, e.g., Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?, supra note 214, at 102,
106.
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tary conceptions of the popular majority; from social choice theory to constructivist theories of representation and more, these scholars reject the idea
that we might derive a meaningful form of majority rule by simple aggregation. 247
For our purposes, the important point is not whether one joins company
with those who expressly label the federal Constitution “antimajoritarian.” It
is the comparative observation: whereas state constitutions privilege present,
unmediated popular majorities, the federal Constitution does not; it rejects
at least this form of majority rule.
3.

Political Equality and the Limits of Federalism

Inherently bound up with their distinct approaches to mediated governance and majority rule are state and federal constitutions’ different responses
to political equality, the idea that members of the political community share
equally in the power to influence government. Whereas state constitutions
embrace this democratic commitment, the federal Constitution at least partially rejects it because of federalism itself.
State constitutions have long worried about distortions of political
equality. To facilitate the equal influence of all members of the political
community on government, for example, state constitutional drafters have
repeatedly expanded the role and direct influence of the electorate—through
multiple forms of direct democracy, the statewide election of a broader array
of officials, popular election of both houses of state legislatures, and the ease
of amending state constitutions. State constitutions also exhibit concern with
political equality as an output: seeking to ensure that government works for
all members of the political community, state constitutional provisions guarantee equality, prohibit special legislation, impose procedural constraints,
and require public purposes. 248 These various provisions evince skepticism
of mediated decisionmaking as potentially inegalitarian as well as potentially
antipopular and antimajoritarian.
Although the federal Constitution also evidences certain commitments
to political equality—most notably in the Fourteenth Amendment—it is not
a similarly pervasive principle. In particular, it is challenged by the constitutional commitment to federalism. Privileging states over people, both the
Senate and Electoral College defy political equality, and the Senate’s structure is more hardwired into the Constitution than other provisions. 249 Even
after the Seventeenth Amendment made Senators popularly elected, citizens
of the least populous states have more than fifty times the voting power in

247. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3d ed.
2012); NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (2006).
248. See supra Section I.C.3.
249. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.”).
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the Senate than citizens of large states. 250 So too, the design of the Electoral
College means that presidents can be—and have been—elected after losing
the popular vote, compromising political equality and majority rule alike. 251
These federal constitutional features impede political equality in a manner that has no counterpart at the state level—although, notably, it was not
autonomous state efforts but rather the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that
the Equal Protection Clause requires seats in both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on the basis of population that led to state constitutional amendments in the 1960s and 1970s. 252 The Supreme Court
understood popular political equality to be a requirement of state democracy, even if not its national counterpart. 253 Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny
underscore an important point that we turn to now: state and federal constitutions are not only distinct but also interdependent.
B. Complements
Beyond staking out alternative approaches, state and federal constitutions may be understood as complementary in key respects. To begin, they
are intertwined documents. As Donald Lutz has argued, the federal Constitution is “an incomplete text” 254: “The states are mentioned explicitly or by
direct implication 50 times in 42 separate sections of the U.S. Constitution,”
and many of these instances borrow state constitutional determinations. 255
For example, although the federal Constitution was “born in celebration of
‘republican government,’ ” it “did not grant anyone the right to vote.” 256 Instead, it incorporates the voter qualifications established by states; 257 relies
on state legislatures to “direct” the manner of selecting presidential elec-

250. Wyoming (population 578,759) and California (population 39,512,223) present the
most extreme example. 2019 National and State Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/2019/national-state-estimates
.html [https://perma.cc/6CGG-NBZY].
251. See, e.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2016: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2017),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2016.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/V6F5-ZWP3] (counting 65,853,514 votes for Hillary Clinton and 62,984,828 votes
for Donald Trump).
252. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564–66 (1964); James A. Henretta, Foreword,
Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 839 (1991) (noting that
thirteen states revised their constitutions between 1963 and 1976). But see supra notes 68–72
(noting that state constitutions called for equipopulous districts prior to Reynolds, even if these
requirements were not widely observed).
253. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 564–65 (“To say that a vote is worth more in one district than
in another would . . . run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government . . . .”
(quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))).
254. Lutz, supra note 18, at 32.
255. Id. at 24–25.
256. KEYSSAR, supra note 183, at 4.
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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tors; 258 and leaves the administration of congressional elections to the states,
subject to congressional alteration. 259 At the same time, state constitutions
sometimes directly incorporate provisions of the federal Constitution, 260 and
they operate in the shadow of federal supremacy. 261
This mutual dependence reflects deliberate choices of state and federal
constitutional drafters, who have sought both to compensate for perceived
deficiencies of the other document and to emulate or incorporate by reference congenial provisions. As we have noted, for example, the 1789 federal
constitutional design not only incorporated state law but also reacted against
perceived excesses of democracy and majoritarianism at the state level. 262 On
the flip side, developments in state constitutional rights have been prompted
by perceived federal requirements, federal vacuums, or both. State educational rights are illustrative: many Southern states included educational
rights to address congressional pressure prior to their readmission to the
Union; 263 a century later, education-equality advocates reacted to federal
constitutional defeat by turning to state constitutions and state courts. 264 As
this further underscores, the complementarity of state and federal constitutions reflects not only choices of drafters but also decisions by underlying
social and political movements. Given their greater permeability, state constitutions have long been a site of national organizing, with amendments and
interpretations generated by coordinated nationwide efforts. 265
Viewing state and federal constitutions as parts of a whole thus provides
a more complete view of American constitutionalism. 266 Although this argument applies to a number of domains, we focus here on one of the most
pressing for American democracy: How might state and federal complementarity speak to fears of minority rule, on the one hand, and tyranny of the
majority, on the other? As Neil Komesar has written, “[t]wo visions of political malfunction—one stressing fear of the many and the other stressing fear
of the few—coexist in our traditional views of government. At various times
and by various parties, one or the other of these conceptions has been envi-

258. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
259. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
260. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (canvassing apportionment provisions).
261. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
262. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
263. Black, supra note 45, at 765–67.
264. See ZACKIN, supra note 21, at 74–75, 98.
265. See id. at 21. National politicians also frequently advocated state constitutional
changes. See, e.g., supra note 237 and accompanying text (quoting Roosevelt’s speech to Ohio’s
1912 Convention); DINAN, supra note 18, at 16 (noting state convention speeches by Dwight
Eisenhower and Earl Warren).
266. As numerous scholars of state constitutions have long argued. See, e.g., DINAN, supra note 18; FRITZ, supra note 18; TARR, supra note 31; ZACKIN, supra note 21.
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sioned as the sole or paramount evil.” 267 The Federalists worried that a
“small republic” would enable majority factions to rule “without regard for
the rights of minorities,” while the Anti-Federalists feared the constitution
would establish a small ruling class that would “reflect[] only the interests of
the few.” 268 Years of debates between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams
made clear that “Adams believed in restraining the will of the majority, Jefferson in submitting to it.” 269 In the context of judicial review, decades of
scholarship have feared and attempted to rebut a “counter-majoritarian difficulty” raised by unelected judges reviewing the decisions of elected officials. 270 But those who have studied the state judiciary identify an opposing
fear—that of the “majoritarian difficulty,” or judging by elected officials who
imperil unpopular minorities. 271
Both the federal and state constitutions independently seek to balance
protections for majorities and minorities, most notably by conjoining popular elections with minority-protecting rights. But this hardly resolves the
question of majority tyranny and minority rule. Few accept rights provisions
alone as sufficient to protect minorities, yet limiting majority rule in the first
instance risks “[m]inoritarian bias”—“an inordinate power of the few at the
expense of the many” 272—which may not protect vulnerable minorities so
much as further empower the “wealthy or well-connected few” and exacerbate inequality. 273
While the coexistence of state and federal constitutions does not resolve
the inevitable tension between majoritarianism and minoritarianism, it does
enable additional mediating work. Insofar as state constitutions are more solicitous of the majority, while the federal Constitution is more skeptical of
majoritarianism, state and federal constitutions help to address distinct
shortcomings of the other.
Indeed, half of this argument is widely assumed: the tyranny of the majority at the state level may be checked by the federal Constitution. Since Reconstruction, the federal Constitution has been seen as an answer to the
most pernicious forms of state majoritarianism, racial apartheid and discrimination. Not only federal constitutional rights, such as those contained
in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but also federally imposed requirements about the structure and operation of state government may

267. Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 668 (1988); see also DAHL, supra note 25, at 4
(“[P]reoccupation with the rights and wrongs of majority rule has run like a red thread
through American political thought since 1789.”).
268. Jean Yarbrough, Representation and Republicanism: Two Views, PUBLIUS, Spring
1979, at 77, 85, 88.
269. JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (2018).
270. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).
271. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 148, at 694.
272. Komesar, supra note 267, at 671.
273. Tarr, supra note 111, at 89.
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combat the expression of majority rule as white supremacy. The Voting
Rights Act, and other legislation adopted to enforce federal constitutional
guarantees, imposes limits on majority rule at the state level to protect racial
and ethnic minorities. 274
But if it is widely accepted that the federal Constitution speaks to problems of state majority tyranny, it has not been similarly appreciated that state
constitutions speak to problems of federal minority rule. Reclaiming the
state constitutional commitment to democracy may ameliorate democratic
shortcomings at the federal level as well as in the states, as state constitutions
constrain federal minoritarianism both from within and without.
First, state constitutions may temper the antimajoritarian composition
of the federal government. States are the building blocks of the federal government. From the federal Constitution’s express incorporation of state electoral rules to the selection of the president, senators, and representatives by
state populations to districting for the House by state legislatures, states critically compose the federal government. The federal design necessarily impedes national majoritarianism, but additional departures from popular
majority rule in the states may exacerbate the federal government’s unrepresentative character. To be sure, departures from majority rule in the states
need not have this effect; theoretically, system effects could mean even outright minority rule in the fifty states ultimately yields something more akin
to national majority rule in the aggregate. 275 But political pathologies, residential patterns, and more make this unlikely; at least as a practical matter,
departures from majority rule at the state level compound problems of minority rule at the federal level. 276 State actors who evade the state constitutional guarantees of majority rule and political equality through partisan
gerrymandering and voter suppression, for example, worsen federal minoritarianism. Conversely, reining in these antidemocratic practices and recovering the state constitutional commitment to popular majorities would
constrain federal minoritarianism.
Second, in addition to composing federal institutions, states also directly
engage in national policymaking. Because of the federal Constitution’s anti274. E.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10702 (formerly cited as 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1). But see Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (significantly curtailing the VRA).
275. See Vermeule, supra note 244.
276. See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA (2d ed. 2016). One place we might expect to see offsetting effects is partisan gerrymandering. See, e.g., Aaron Goldzimer & Nicholas Stephanopoulous, Democrats Can’t Be
Afraid to Gerrymander Now, SLATE (July 3, 2019, 4:05 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/07/democrats-gerrymandering-scotus-rucho.html [https://perma.cc/DK73-REH7]
(arguing that blue states might “offset red state gerrymanders elsewhere” and craft their “congressional districts with the aim of national partisan fairness”). To date, however, blue states
have been “unilaterally disarming,” id., while red states engage in increasingly extreme gerrymandering—a disparity consistent with the parties’ asymmetric practices more generally. See
Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 915 (2018).
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majoritarian character, national decisionmaking often fails to reflect the national popular will, but national majority preferences will tend to be shared
by majorities in at least a number of states. 277 Given the substantial overlap
of state and federal policy domains since at least the New Deal, states provide
fifty disaggregated sites for national governance. 278 Insofar as state constitutions empower popular majorities to govern, then, they may directly facilitate majoritarian decisionmaking that counterbalances the federal
government’s more minoritarian approach. Sometimes, decisionmaking at
the state level will reflect the preferences of a state majority that is not a national majority, 279 but in many cases, states may also offer voice to national
majorities. State constitutions, in turn, empower those majorities to act in
ways that challenge or substitute for national decisions.
Often, this pushback tracks what one of us has termed “partisan federalism”: red and blue states resisting blue and red national governments, respectively. 280 But the majority-minority clashes facilitated by state
constitutions go beyond partisan politics. In particular, opportunities for direct democracy in the states—in the form of state constitutional amendments as well as subconstitutional initiatives and referenda—allow popular
majorities to work around political parties. Citizens of red states can adopt
policies disfavored by the Republican Party, citizens of blue states can adopt
policies disfavored by the Democratic Party, and, most true to the initiative’s
Progressive roots, citizens of red and blue states alike can adopt policies disfavored by elites in both parties. 281 For example, Medicaid expansion pursuant to Obamacare has been a staunchly partisan issue for elected officials, but
citizens of red states have proposed and adopted initiatives to expand Medicaid. 282 These votes are best understood as efforts by national (and state) ma-

277. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 265, 317–22 (2019); Vicki C. Jackson, The Democratic Deficit of United
States Federalism? Red State, Blue State, Purple?, 46 FED. L. REV. 645, 652 (2018).
278. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 277, at 319–20; Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1897–98 (2014).
279. Indeed, some conceptualize federalism in just this way. Heather Gerken observes
that “[m]ost theories of federalism explicitly or implicitly depend on minority rule,” in which
“national minorities . . . constitute local majorities.” Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court,
2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 & n.10 (2010).
“For instance, states are unlikely to constitute laboratories of democracy or facilitate Tieboutian sorting if the same types of people are making decisions at the state and national levels.”
Id. at 12 n.10. As Gerken’s framing suggests, however, if the national government is governing
for a national minority, states might provide the necessary difference by governing for a national majority that is not represented as such in Washington.
280. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 35, at 1078–81, 1096–108.
281. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1951–56 (2014).
282. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KFF (Feb. 4,
2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisionsinteractive-map/ [https://perma.cc/F8C7-HZAB] (noting that Idaho, Utah, Nebraska, and Oklahoma voters have approved Medicaid expansion ballot initiatives).
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jorities to expand a program at the same time that national (and state) minorities seek to curtail it. Because there is no national referendum process,
state constitutional amendments and initiatives provide the only approximation of national direct democracy.
There is at least a superficial irony here: federalism lies at the root of the
most antidemocratic features of the U.S. Constitution, from unequal representation in the Senate and Electoral College to nearly insurmountable
amendment procedures. But in their independence from, rather than their
partial constitution of, the federal government, states play a different role. If
the way states figure in the federal Constitution is in opposition to majority
rule and popular equality, the way states function as distinct American governments may further popular majority will—at least if the democracy principle is properly understood and implemented.
III. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
Reclaiming the state constitutional commitment to democracy offers resources for evaluating, and potentially invalidating, antidemocratic actions.
This Part describes how the democracy principle can inform numerous disputes by making sense of abundant textual, purposive, and structural clues.
Democracy at the state level is a constitutional concept, 283 not just a political
one, and must be given meaning in constitutional interpretation. This does
not mean that the principle will be dispositive in every dispute that implicates state democracy or that the answers it generates will always be clear.
That would be too much to ask of any such principle. But we believe the democracy principle adds considerable value—by showing that conflicts over
state democracy are constitutional conflicts, by synthesizing the many resources state constitutions provide to protect democratic rule, and by operationalizing a commitment that has long been a central feature of state
founding documents. It is far more faithful to state constitutions to try to
protect democracy than to ignore it.
Indeed, a few state courts have recently recognized as much in the context of partisan gerrymandering. 284 The democracy principle helps to make
sense of and reinforce this emerging body of case law. It also provides a
foundation for states that have yet to recognize partisan gerrymandering as a
constitutional concern to do so.
In other instances, the democracy principle provides a more compelling
justification for decisions reached on different grounds. After voters popularly elected a new governor of North Carolina, for example, the legislature
met in a special session to strip gubernatorial power over the state elections

283. See supra Section I.A (comparing the democracy principle to other constitutional
concepts). Parsing more finely, we might say that we are identifying democracy as a constitutional “concept” in the states and then offering a particular “conception” of it. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8–9 (rev. ed. 1999) (identifying concept-conception distinction).
284. See infra Section III.A.
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board. 285 Although the state supreme court invalidated the change on separation-of-powers grounds, it made no reference to the legislature’s power
grab. 286 Speaking directly to this problem, the democracy principle provides
a sounder basis for striking down such lame-duck laws. 287
In still other instances, the democracy principle yields altogether different conclusions from those courts have reached. For example, a number of
direct-democracy states allow legislatures to repeal statutory initiatives immediately upon passage. 288 The robust state commitment to popular sovereignty calls for a different approach to legislative nullification of the people’s
policies.
In the pages that follow, we analyze these and related controversies and
describe how the democracy principle limits partisan self-dealing, minority
rule, and attempts to override direct democracy. As our discussion underscores, the democracy principle can only be fully understood and applied
with reference to specific state constitutions; it is a variegated principle because the precise text, history, and structure that compose it vary from state
to state. In this sense, our references to the “democracy principle” are a
shorthand for a number of state-specific commitments. But we also mean to
invoke a shared principle that transcends its instantiation in any given state.
The commitment to popular self-rule pervades all fifty state constitutions
and has emerged through interstate borrowing in drafting and interpretation, as well as through dialogue with the federal Constitution. It is thus appropriate for constitutional interpreters to consider a shared state
commitment to democracy as they make sense of and implement provisions
contained in particular documents. 289
Who are these constitutional interpreters we invoke? An obvious starting point is state courts. Judicial review is a longstanding feature of state constitutional systems, 290 and state courts are often called upon to settle
constitutional disputes and rein in state officials. Although there are examples of state courts stepping back from constitutional enforcement in recent
decades, 291 historically state courts took their constitutional obligations seri-

285. Rebecca Hersher, North Carolina Governor Signs Law Limiting Power of His Successor, NPR (Dec. 16, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/16
/505872501/north-carolina-governor-signs-law-limiting-power-of-his-successor
[https://
perma.cc/3ZPF-MPBC].
286. Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 112–14 (N.C. 2018).
287. See infra Section III.B.
288. See infra Section III.C.
289. See supra Section I.A; cf. GARDNER, supra note 35 (endorsing a functional approach
to state constitutions and proposing that courts should interpret state constitutions to protect
liberty in a federal system).
290. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
169, 207 (1983).
291. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987).
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ously. 292 State courts are particularly well-suited to implement the democracy principle, given their own democratic qualifications—their election, in
most states, and their susceptibility to override through constitutional
amendment if they err. 293
But state courts are not the only, or even the most important, avenue for
reclaiming state democracy. To the contrary, the state constitutional tradition is one that empowers the people of the states directly. 294 In some cases,
judges will misapply or overlook state constitutional constraints on antidemocratic behavior. A number of the political pathologies that underlie our
discussion also affect state courts, and judicial decisions are not immune
from such pathologies. More public and scholarly attention to state courts
can help on this front, but only to some degree. 295 In other cases, state courts
may correctly conclude that a particular government action is not unconstitutional even given the democracy principle.
In either of those situations, the democracy principle may be invoked by
nonjudicial actors. It offers opposing government officials, organizers, and
members of the broader public a language and role morality to push back
against antidemocratic behavior. In some instances, reclaiming state democracy will provide the vocabulary for amending state constitutions to reject
actions that depart from the state tradition yet do not violate the constitution
as written. 296
Addressing judicial and nonjudicial actors alike, the remainder of this
Part considers a number of contemporary controversies and sketches legal
and political adjustments that reclaiming state democracy entails. While fully applying the democracy principle to any given dispute necessarily involves
more considerations than we can air here, this discussion provides a starting
point. State constitutions offer extensive, underappreciated resources for
combating antidemocratic behavior, and we hope the following discussion
motivates more case-specific consideration.

292. W.F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE
L.J. 137, 156–57 (1919). Although such constitutional enforcement has often involved constraining state legislatures, it would be a mistake to conflate these constraints with limits on
government as such. ZACKIN, supra note 21, at 34 (noting that state constitutional constraints
include both prohibitions and “mandates for legislative action”).
293. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1886–91 (2001).
294. See, e.g., ZACKIN, supra note 21; Reed, supra note 20, at 887.
295. Miriam Seifter, Unwritten State Constitutions? In Search of Constitutional Participants (Sept. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
296. This is the most likely avenue for addressing state constitutional provisions that require supermajority approval before a change can occur, such as California’s Proposition 13.
See, e.g., Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133 (1999); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243.
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A. Partisan Gerrymandering
Consider first an application of the democracy principle that has already
begun to receive traction. State courts in Pennsylvania 297 and North Carolina 298 have recently held extreme partisan gerrymanders unconstitutional
under their respective state constitutions. The democracy principle provides
both a fruitful way to understand and additional support for these decisions.
As the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause directs additional attention to state courts, 299 moreover, the principle should underpin
similar decisions in other states. Even if state constitutional provisions specifically addressing districting (such as compactness requirements) are “not
adequate to the task of restricting partisan gerrymandering,” 300 other state
constitutional resources, including provisions conferring voting rights and
forbidding government favoritism, offer powerful tools. 301
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a gerrymander by the Republican state legislature designed to give a decisive advantage to Republicans. In the three elections held under the plan, Republicans won thirteen
congressional seats and Democrats won five, even though the Republican
vote share ranged between 49.2 percent and 55.5 percent; in 2012, Republicans won a supermajority of seats despite Democrats receiving a higher percentage of the state vote. 302 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that
the gerrymander violated the state’s “Free and Equal Elections” clause, which
“provides the people of this Commonwealth an equally effective power to
select the representative of his or her choice, and bars the dilution of the
people’s power to do so.” 303 Drawing on text, history, and case law, the court
interpreted the clause as an effort “to end, once and for all, the primary cause
of popular dissatisfaction which undermined the governance of Pennsylva-

297. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 801–02 (Pa. 2018).
298. Common Cause v. Lewis, 18-CVS-014001, 2019 WL 4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept.
3, 2019).
299. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (holding that partisan
gerrymandering is not justiciable under the federal Constitution).
300. James A. Gardner, Foreword, Representation Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 889–90 (2006) (emphasis
omitted).
301. See id. at 968 (raising this possibility); James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for
Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 648 (2004) (arguing that the
state constitutional right to vote and requirement of “free,” “open,” or “equal” elections might
underlie challenges to partisan gerrymandering); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Richard F. Ober Jr. &
Ben Williams, Laboratories of Democracy Reform: State Constitutions and Partisan Gerrymandering, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 203 (2019) (“[S]tate courts have a long and rich history of protecting representational rights by striking down districting schemes for violating their
respective constitutions.”).
302. League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 764.
303. Id. at 814; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Elections shall be free and equal; and no
power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
suffrage.”).
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nia: namely, the dilution of the right of the people . . . to select representatives . . . based on” factors like political or religious beliefs or their region of
the state. 304
This decision both illustrates and is bolstered by the democracy principle. For example, the court stated that it was important to adopt a “broad
and robust” reading of the free and equal elections clause because unequal
voting power is “the antithesis of a healthy representative democracy.” 305 It
further noted that Article I, in which the clause is located, “spells out the social contract between government and the people” and indicates that legislative power is “not absolute.” 306 Reading the free and equal elections clause in
context, the court recognized that “for our form of government to operate as
intended, each and every Pennsylvania voter must have the same free and
equal opportunity to select his or her representatives.” 307 These and related
passages of the opinion operationalize the state constitutional commitment
to popular sovereignty and political equality. As the court recognized, partisan gerrymandering of the sort at issue entails legislative self-dealing that at
once undermines the ability of the people to share equally in the power to
influence government and confers special treatment on members of one political party. 308
Recent litigation concerning North Carolina’s 2017 gerrymander, which
was designed “to advantage Republicans and reduce the effectiveness of
Democratic votes” 309 in composing the state legislature, also implicates the
democracy principle. The state court analyzed the text, history, and purposes
of North Carolina’s free elections clause and concluded that “extreme partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts run[s] afoul of the mandate of the
Free Elections Clause by depriving citizens of elections that are conducted
freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people.” 310 The court expressed particular concern with ensuring the ability of
the people to equally influence government and foreclosing self-serving government action:
[I]t is clear to the Court that extreme partisan gerrymandering—namely
redistricting plans that entrench politicians in power, that evince a fundamental distrust of voters by serving the self-interest of political parties over

304. League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 808–09; see also id. at 818 (holding that the
gerrymander “subordinate[d] the traditional redistricting criteria in the service of partisan advantage”).
305. Id. at 814.
306. Id. at 803.
307. Id. at 814 (emphasis omitted).
308. In some cases, such partisan gerrymandering also directly contravenes majority
rule—for instance, when it enables a minority of the electorate to elect a majority of the state
legislature or congressional delegation, as in the 2012 Pennsylvania elections.
309. Common Cause v. Lewis, 18-CVS-014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *10 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
310. Id. at *110; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“All elections shall be free.”).
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the public good, and that dilute and devalue votes of some citizens compared to others—is contrary to the fundamental right of North Carolina
citizens to have elections conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly
and truthfully, the will of the people. 311

The court thus interpreted the North Carolina Constitution holistically, construing the free elections clause (as well as the equal protection and free expression clauses 312) in light of state commitments to popular sovereignty and
political equality.
The court’s conclusions are grounded in the best reading of state constitutional law, one that synthesizes text, history, purposes, and structure.
Moreover, the seeds of a democracy principle also appear in earlier North
Carolina precedents. For example, the Common Cause court cited an 1897
case expressing something like what Rick Hasen has termed “the Democracy
Canon” 313: the 1897 court emphasized that “this is a government of the people, in which the will of the people—the majority—legally expressed, must
govern.” 314 In turn, the court stated that the provision at issue, “and all acts
providing for elections, should be liberally construed, that tend to promote a
fair election or expression of this popular will.” 315 Extending these principles
from vote counting to districting, Common Cause limits incumbent officials’
ability to contort the electoral preferences of the people.
Although both the Pennsylvania and North Carolina decisions drew on
provisions and histories specific to those states, similar provisions and driving purposes appear in other state constitutions as well. In addition to proclaiming popular sovereignty, for example, all state constitutions expressly
confer the right to vote, most require “free and equal” elections or a variation
thereon, and some more specifically indicate that voters have an equal right
to elect government. 316 State constitutions also seek to foreclose government
favoritism. They are explicit about both ensuring opportunities for equal
participation and foreclosing special treatment; provisions governing equality, bans on special laws, and general-purpose requirements aspire to prevent

311. Lewis, 2019 WL 4569584, at *110.
312. Id. at *116–17 (concluding that North Carolina’s equal protection clause, N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 19, protects a “fundamental right” to “substantially equal voting power” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 394 (N.C. 2002))); id. at *118–
24 (considering N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 14).
313. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009).
314. State ex rel. Quinn v. Lattimore, 26 S.E. 638, 638 (N.C. 1897); see also N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right
originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good
of the whole.”).
315. Lattimore, 26 S.E. at 638.
316. See supra Part I. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina provide that
all qualified voters have an equal right to vote or to elect officers, while West Virginia provides
that every citizen is entitled to equal representation in government. MASS. CONST. declaration
of rights, art. IX; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–
4.
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“the granting of special privileges for a select few.” 317 As the commitment to
political equality has developed in the state constitutional tradition, it has
been particularly concerned with special treatment of the “wealthy or wellconnected few,” 318 but it extends to other forms of special treatment, including narrowly personal and more broadly partisan self-dealing by government
officials.
State constitutions thus furnish extensive resources for combatting factional activity that contravenes popular sovereignty and political equality
and impedes voters’ ability to choose their governments. To be sure, the precise test for when a partisan gerrymander is unconstitutional may fairly be
disputed, as extensive debates about gerrymandering underscore. But the
basic principle is clear, and recent gerrymanders do not call for difficult conceptual line drawing. 319 The democracy principle thus provides additional
support for recent gerrymandering precedents and suggests additional paths
of inquiry for state courts that have not yet considered the question.
It also suggests that the Supreme Court’s invocation of state constitutions in Rucho should not be read as mere hand-waving. As it refused to invalidate partisan gerrymanders under the federal Constitution, the Court
noted that “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide
standards and guidance for state courts to apply.” 320 This is true not simply
as a matter of justiciability; state constitutions also provide substantive protections against antidemocratic conduct that the federal Constitution does
not. And insofar as state constitutions combat partisan self-dealing and invalidate extreme partisan gerrymanders, they serve national as well as state
democracy. Most directly, they yield more representative congressional delegations. Because the federal Constitution is “incomplete” and relies on states
to draw federal districts, state decisions about gerrymandering immediately
reshape the federal government. 321 More indirectly, by foreclosing extreme
partisan gerrymanders of state legislatures, state constitutions may make
these legislatures better vehicles for advancing national popular majority interests. 322 Such effects underscore that the democracy principle is a critical
part of American constitutionalism, not simply state constitutionalism.
A further point bears mention: realizing the potential of state constitutions to thwart extreme partisan gerrymandering is an important project for
state courts, 323 but it does not fall to courts alone. Other state actors participate (or can participate) in redistricting in various ways: legislators, of

317. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 975 (Or. 1982); see supra
Part I.
318. Tarr, supra note 111, at 89.
319. Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(endorsing “judicial intervention in the worst-of-the-worst cases of democratic subversion”).
320. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion).
321. See Lutz, supra note 18, at 25; see supra note 274.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 273–278.
323. Cf. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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course, but also nonpartisan legislative staff, members of redistricting commissions and their staff, governors and their counsel, attorneys general who
clarify the rules of the process, and members of the public who comment on
proposals. 324 The democracy principle forms a basis on which all of these actors should oppose extreme partisan gerrymandering.
To be sure, some actors will be unmoved by the principle. We do not
suggest that legislators proposing an extreme gerrymander will suddenly see
the constitutional light and stand down, or that an opposing-party governor
needs the state constitution to draft the veto she would write anyway. Yet the
democracy principle may do meaningful work in other nonjudicial settings.
Consider first how administrative constitutionalism may be a realistic
avenue for the democracy principle. 325 Roughly twenty states use some form
of commission in redistricting, either to draw lines initially or as a backup
mechanism. 326 Each of these administrative bodies has a duty to follow the
state constitution, and the democracy principle helps to clarify how they
must do so. 327 There is reason to believe that many commissions will take
constitutional argument seriously. Although redistricting inevitably involves

324. For overviews of the entities in charge of redistricting in each state, see Who Draws
the Maps? Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-draws-maps-legislative-andcongressional-redistricting [https://perma.cc/P4UZ-G53F]; State-by-State Redistricting Reform:
The Local Routes, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, http://gerrymander.princeton.edu
[https://perma.cc/STG8-WNUZ]; and ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu
[https://perma.cc/7J3U-H7KV].
325. For background on administrative constitutionalism, see Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the Present, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (2019) (“Defined most broadly, it refers to agencies’ role in constructing
constitutional norms such as adequate due process, the bounds of free speech, or the scope of
executive power, whether or not agencies consider themselves to be doing so. More narrowly,
it includes only instances in which agencies self-consciously consider the meaning of the Constitution in designing policies and issuing decisions.”). Although we deem redistricting commissions to be agencies for purposes of considering administrative constitutionalism, it is
immaterial to our claim which “branch” these commissions—often comprising appointees
from various branches—belong to.
326. These include commissions dedicated to drawing state legislative districts, congressional districts, or both. For key provisions, see ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 44–
44.6, 46–48.4; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2;
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; IND. CODE § 3-3-2-2 (2019); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MISS. CONST.
art. 13, § 254; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 7; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2;
id. art. IV, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; id. art. XIX, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 11a; PA.
CONST. art. II, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28; and WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43.
327. Redistricting commissions in a number of states also have more specific constitutional instructions. For example, many state constitutions require compactness of districts, and
five state constitutions require commissions to avoid undue preference for parties or individuals or to strive for competitive districts. See Justin Levitt, Where the Lines Are Drawn – State
Legislative Districts, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/wheretablestate.php [https://perma.cc/2ZMF-VU4X] (listing rules in each state).
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political considerations, 328 even “politician commissions” often grant a tiebreaking vote to an ostensibly nonpartisan member (chosen jointly by the
other members, for example, or by the state supreme court). 329 Moreover,
other state commissions, like California’s, involve members who are not professional politicians. 330 Commissions’ professional staff members or consultants, including attorneys, are appropriate advocates for the democracy
principle. 331
Executive constitutionalism, too, may allow the democracy principle to
gain traction outside of courts. Attorneys general in all states have the power
to issue opinions clarifying state law. 332 While these opinions do not themselves carry the force of law, they are regularly treated as authoritative by
state officials and state courts, and they are often the final word in practice. 333 As Justin Levitt and Jim Tierney have noted, attorneys general have a
variety of roles to play in redistricting. 334 They may opine on the overall le-

328. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030
(2001) (quipping, based on personal service in both entities, that congressional redistricting by
the state legislature was 100 percent political, while legislative redistricting by the state commission was 98 percent political). See generally Justin Levitt, Essay, Weighing the Potential of
Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 531 (2011).
329. See Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western
United States, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637, 648, 652 (2013) (“The presence of ‘independent’
members of a bipartisan or tripartite commission, especially if one of them is the chair, may
facilitate interparty bargaining.”).
330. See generally Background on Commission, WEDRAWTHELINES.CA.GOV,
https://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission/ [https://perma.cc/6QS6-DG26] (describing California’s application and selection systems and its practice of rotating commission leadership).
For other state provisions restricting participation by politicians, see ALASKA CONST. art. VI,
§ 8(a); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.1(2)(c) (congressional redistricting commission); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(2)(c) (legislative redistricting commission);
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); IOWA CODE § 42.5 (2021); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(1)(b);
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-19201(6)(b) (2018) (repealed 2020); and WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43.
331. Multiple commission processes begin with maps drawn by nonpartisan staff. See,
e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 44.4, 48.2; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 7. Still more have explicit
authority to hire staff members to assist with the commission’s work. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST.
art. VI, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(19); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253 (2012 & Supp. 2020);
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.2; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(4); N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 5-b(h); PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(g); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, ch. 31A, § 1904(e)
(2018).
332. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 80–90 (Emily Myers ed., 4th ed. 2018); Ian Eppler, The Opinion Power of the
State Attorney General and the Attorney General as a Public Law Actor, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
111, 115 (2019) (discussing differences in the form and scope of the opinion power across
states).
333. Eppler, supra note 332, at 115–17; see James E. Tierney & Justin Levitt, The Role of
Attorneys General in Federal and State Redistricting in 2020, STATEAG.ORG,
https://www.stateag.org/redistricting [https://perma.cc/R6SE-UBYN] (calling attorney general
opinions a “powerful default”).
334. See Levitt & Tierney, supra note 333.
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gality of a redistricting plan, as well as on the procedural and substantive
rules for the districting process. 335 Exercising that “substantial interpretive
authority,” attorneys general could invoke the democracy principle to explain why extreme partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally infirm. 336
Moreover, governors and attorneys general alike can leverage their bully
pulpit and convening powers. Governors can create special commissions or
other bodies to propose fair maps, 337 providing a ready alternative to gerrymandered maps and forcing legislatures to defend their divergent choices.
Attorneys general, too, can be a “public counterweight to partisan or other
excesses of the primary districting body,” including by making public remarks or setting up commissions of their own. 338 In turn, these actions can
help spur public discourse and grassroots organizing, increasing the political
costs of adopting or tolerating extreme partisan gerrymanders.
B. Lame-Duck Entrenchment and Power Stripping
The democracy principle also helps to address state efforts to stymie
popular majorities both at particular moments in time and across time. Official entrenchment is an age-old concern. 339 At the federal level, the conventional view is that the Constitution prohibits at least some strong forms of
entrenchment. 340 Yet scholars have struggled to explain the foundation for
this view. It might be a structural principle, 341 a feature of original meaning, 342 or a “temporal mandate” derived from the structure of elections. 343 Or
it might be that the Constitution does not supply the anti-entrenchment
principle but democratic theory does. 344 Meanwhile, skeptics of the anti-

335. Id.
336. Id. at 3.
337. See Laurel White, Gov. Tony Evers Orders Creation of Nonpartisan Redistricting
Commission, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 27, 2020, 9:10 AM), https://www.wpr.org/gov-tony-eversorders-creation-nonpartisan-redistricting-commission [https://perma.cc/QKY5-76P5].
338. Tierney & Levitt, supra note 333.
339. There are many different definitions of entrenchment. Our use of the term here does
not include functional forms of entrenchment. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs,
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015). Our narrower focus is on officials maintaining themselves in power or limiting the power of future majorities in formal
ways.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing Blackstone
for “the centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its
successors”).
341. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE
L.J. 189 (1972).
342. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution,
98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010).
343. Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 379.
344. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 499 (1997).
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entrenchment principle argue that some forms of entrenchment are “both
constitutionally permissible and, in appropriate circumstances, normatively
attractive.” 345
State constitutions provide stronger resources for contesting entrenchment because they privilege popular majority rule in ways the federal Constitution does not, from electoral frameworks that determine how state officials
will be selected to governance frameworks that determine how government
action may be pursued. 346
Here, we explore how the democracy principle addresses one particularly salient example of entrenchment: the use of lame-duck sessions to remove
the powers of incoming popularly elected officials. Courts have yet to describe these lame-duck laws as antidemocratic efforts at minority entrenchment, but that is just what they are. The democracy principle helps to
explain why such maneuvers controvert popular majority rule in a constitutionally cognizable way.
Consider two recent lame-duck power grabs. First, in North Carolina,
after voters elected Democrat Roy Cooper as governor in the 2016 election,
the Republican-controlled legislature met in a surprise special session and
enacted sweeping changes to executive power in the state. 347 The lame-duck
enactments drastically shrunk the number of gubernatorial appointees, restructured the state’s industrial commission to preserve a Republican majority, and reorganized the state’s elections board. 348 With respect to the
elections board, the new laws transformed it from a body controlled by the
governor’s party to a board evenly divided between appointees from both
parties and further mandated the retention of the GOP-selected executive
director. 349 As critics explained, these changes would have “give[n] Republican appointees the power to veto any matter under consideration, including
changes to the rules or procedures adopted by the previous Republicancontrolled Board.” 350
The North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately rejected these changes,
but it did not mention the obvious entrenchment at issue or the antidemo-

345. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002).
346. See supra Parts I & II.
347. Trip Gabriel, North Carolina G.O.P. Moves to Curb Power of New Democratic Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/us/politics/northcarolina-governor-roy-cooper-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/458G-J6NG].
348. See Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217,
1225–26 (2019).
349. Rather than appoint three members of a five-member board, the governor would
now make four appointments of an eight-member board, the legislature would make the other
four, and Republicans would chair the board in even-numbered (i.e., election) years. Id. at
1225; S.B. 4, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 4th Extra Sess. § 138B-2 (N.C. 2016).
350. Amici Curiae the Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y.U. Sch. of L. & Democracy N.C.’s
Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98 (N.C.
2018) (No. 52PA17-2), 2017 WL 3456374, at *5 [hereinafter Brennan Center Brief].
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cratic nature of the lame-duck legislation. Rather, it held that the new arrangement violated the separation of powers and the state constitution’s take
care clause by depriving the governor of adequate control over a state agency. 351 The court reasoned that the state legislature had overstepped because
the governor was required to select half of the commission from a list of
people likely hostile to his agenda, and because the governor had limited supervisory and removal authority over commission members. 352 Such an arrangement, the court reasoned, “ ‘leaves the Governor with little control over
the views and priorities of the [majority of] officers’ and prevents the Governor from having ‘the final say on how to execute the laws.’ ” 353
This holding is questionable. Although the court emphasized it was applying a context-dependent standard, not a “categorical rule,” 354 and although it purported not to foreclose all independent agencies, 355 its ruling
suddenly cast doubt on the constitutionality of both agency independence
and requirements of bipartisanship in agency composition, two longstanding
features of the state’s government. Independent agencies commonly entail all
three of the factors the court found problematic: limits on chief-executive
selection (as when the governor must select from a list or balance party
composition), limits on chief-executive supervision, and limits on chiefexecutive removal. 356 As the dissent pointed out, the Federal Election Commission would be unconstitutional under the majority’s analysis. 357 It seems
particularly odd to adopt such a unitarian theory in the states, where a plural
executive structure is the rule. 358
The democracy principle provides a sounder basis for striking down the
North Carolina lame-duck laws. 359 Instead of relying on gubernatorial power
as such, the court could have held that an outgoing government cannot substantially alter the powers of newly elected officials. The North Carolina legislature ironically defended its actions as ensuring “majority rule,” 360 yet the

351. Cooper, 809 S.E.2d at 114.
352. Id. (basing the violation on the fact that the Governor “is required to appoint half of
the commission members from a list of nominees consisting of individuals who are, in all likelihood, not supportive of, if not openly opposed to, his or her policy preferences while having
limited supervisory control over the agency and circumscribed removal authority over commission members”).
353. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 781 S.E.2d 248,
257 (N.C. 2016)).
354. Id. at 111.
355. Id. at 113.
356. Seifter, supra note 63, at 1561–62.
357. Cooper, 809 S.E.2d at 119 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
358. See supra Part I; see also Seifter, supra note 63, at 1551–52.
359. See generally Brennan Center Brief, supra note 350 (advancing a congenial argument).
360. Craig Jarvis, North Carolina Governor Signs Bill Limiting His Successor’s Power,
GOVERNING (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/tns-mccrory-cooperbill.html [https://perma.cc/5DXY-FDMD].
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lame-duck legislation had just the opposite effect: stripping power from an
official who had just been selected by statewide popular vote. 361
The North Carolina Constitution’s popular sovereignty and elections
provisions, 362 construed in light of the state commitment to democracy, are
best understood to foreclose lame-duck officials from altering institutions to
deprive incoming officials of their powers. An outgoing legislature stripping
power from officials the people just elected is not faithful to the constitutional declaration that “[a]ll political power is vested in and derived from the
people; all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon
their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.” 363 Nor is
such a power grab reconcilable with a holistic reading of North Carolina’s
elections clauses. Those clauses declare not only that elections must be
“free,” 364 and that such elections for governor are to occur every four years,
but also that a purpose of frequent elections is “[f]or redress of grievances.” 365 Stripping officials of the powers they were just elected to hold defeats
elections as an avenue for majority redress. The legislature should be free to
take up institutional changes, but only after the new government assumes
office and only through the usual procedures, including a gubernatorial veto.
The democracy principle would also have bite with respect to recent
events in Wisconsin. There, among other executive-power-stripping
measures, the legislature used its 2018 lame-duck session to transfer authority from the just-elected attorney general to a single legislative committee
with a Republican supermajority. 366 Under the new law, the attorney general
cannot make various litigation decisions (including whether to settle a case)
without committee approval. 367 A state trial court initially enjoined the law,
holding that it violated the separation of powers by shifting executive functions to the legislature. 368 But the state supreme court ultimately upheld it,
holding that the statute was not facially unconstitutional. 369 In our view, the
circuit court’s opinion was sound, even under the state’s flexible separationof-powers doctrine—the legislative branch is usurping an executive function.
Still, placing the state constitutional commitment to democracy front and
center would have strengthened the case against the legislation.

361. The lame-duck legislation was still more concerning because the legislature itself
was heavily gerrymandered and unrepresentative. See supra Section III.A.
362. See N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9–10; id. art. VI.
363. Id. art. I, § 2.
364. Id. § 10.
365. Id. § 9 (“For redress of grievances and for amending and strengthening the laws,
elections shall be often held.”).
366. S.B. 884, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2018).
367. Id. § 30.
368. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, No. 19CV302, 2019 WL 1396826 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2019).
369. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 946 N.W.2d 35, 56 (Wis. 2020).
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The Wisconsin statute offends the democracy principle in two ways.
First, as in the North Carolina case, it substantially alters the attorney general’s power through lame-duck lawmaking. Second, it limits his power in an
ongoing fashion by allowing an unrepresentative committee to impose overrides that only the full legislature should be allowed to impose through bicameralism and presentment. Instead of treating the newly elected attorney
general’s decisions as the final word absent valid legislation, the lame-duck
legislature gave the people precisely what they did not ask for: Republican
control over the state’s litigation.
But Wisconsin’s constitution, like North Carolina’s, proclaims popular
sovereignty, specifying that state officials “deriv[e] their just powers from the
consent of the governed.” 370 Wisconsin is also among the states with a “fundamental principles” clause declaring that “[t]he blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation,
temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles.” 371 In addition, Wisconsin’s elections-related clauses—identifying
every adult citizen as an elector, 372 specifying elections for governor every
four years, 373 and allocating gubernatorial victory to the highest vote getter 374—sit uneasily with lame-duck power grabs, especially when these clauses are interpreted against the backdrop of the history and democratic
traditions described above.
A structural argument points in the same direction: it is hard to consider
the institutions and relationships created by the Wisconsin Constitution and
believe that the state legislature—itself a target of sustained suspicion by constitutional drafters—has authority to functionally undo the choices of electors, whose authority is privileged throughout the document. Applying the
democracy principle would foreclose outgoing officials’ ability to countermand voters’ choices and would vindicate the ability of a popular majority to
select its government.
Although the textual provisions and histories described above are specific to North Carolina and Wisconsin, respectively, other state constitutions
contain similar clauses and embrace similar traditions. 375 It is quite likely
that these states similarly foreclose outgoing officials from altering the roles
and powers of newly elected officials in ways that infringe the authority of a
majority of voters to select their government. Some states go further: a few

370. WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
371. Id. § 22. One state judge, rejecting the idea that the clause is a mere “rhetorical flourish,” argued that “it disclosed . . . the deep-seated belief which the Constitution makers held in
the necessity for a Constitution.” A.H. Reid, Legislative Suggestion, A Frequent Recurrence of
Fundamental Principles, 1 MARQ. L. REV. 186, 186, 190 (1917).
372. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1.
373. Id. art. V, § 3.
374. Id.
375. See supra Part I.
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constitutions foreclose lame-duck sessions, 376 and several states have recently
proposed amendments to eliminate these sessions (though passage by incumbents seems unlikely). 377 In the majority of states where lame-duck sessions occur, state courts and other constitutional interpreters might derive
from their constitutions a broad rule against institutional change during
lame-duck sessions or a more tailored standard foreclosing only those institutional changes made during a lame-duck session that entrench minority
power against popular will as expressed in state elections.
To be sure, constitutional interpreters might also offer arguments to defend the constitutionality of lame-duck power grabs. For example, one might
cite historical practice, pointing out that power grabs by state officials are not
unprecedented. This is certainly true, and yet postelection sessions are not a
longstanding feature of state legislative traditions because state legislators
historically were only part-time. Typically, governors had to call special sessions to accommodate out-of-session needs, and legislatures had to adhere to
the issues noticed for the special session. 378
Or one might invoke a trans-state variant of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, arguing that the foreclosing of lame-duck sessions in some constitutions means that the absence of such provisions in other constitutions speaks
to the absence of any restrictions on such sessions. As an initial matter, we
are skeptical about the force of this approach: reading state constitutions together makes good sense, but the simple absence of any particular provision
in one constitution cannot be dispositive. In any event, this particular sort of
expressio unius argument would be a willful overreading: the foreclosing of
lame-duck sessions in some constitutions and not others may well support a
presumption that such sessions are permissible in the silent constitutions,
but it does not support a presumption that lame-duck legislatures may act in
any manner they please.
Ultimately, simply engaging with the force of the democracy principle
would be a step forward. Even if one concluded that a particular counterargument trumped (or altered) the principle as applied to certain facts, recognizing the competing constitutional claims would more accurately capture
the stakes of the controversy. 379 While any specific rule would have to follow

376. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 46 (“The terms of office of the senators and representatives
shall commence on the day after the general election at which they are elected . . . .”); IND.
CONST. art. 4, § 3 (similar); NEV. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3–4 (similar). Florida forecloses lame ducks
by statute. FLA. STAT. tit. IX, § 100.041 (2020) (“The term of office of each member of the Legislature shall begin upon election.”).
377. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. C, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); Tim Anderson, Capital Closeup: Proposal in Illinois, Michigan Aim to Kill the ‘Lame Duck’ Session, COUNCIL ST.
GOV’TS (May 2015), https://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/0515-lame-duck.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3DLC-DG3V].
378. See PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 272 (2012).
379. Cf. supra text accompanying note 26 (analogizing the democracy principle to constitutional concepts such as federalism, which are widely contested but recognized as constitutional concepts).
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from a particular state’s constitutional text, history, and structure, there is
good reason to believe state constitutions generally protect the ability of a
majority of voters to select their government in ways that render lame-duck
entrenchment constitutionally problematic.
As with gerrymandering, it should not fall to state courts alone to marshal the democracy principle. Attorneys general, again, are well-positioned
to opine on the unconstitutionality of such laws. 380 And if courts do not
strike down lame-duck power grabs as unconstitutional, executive officials
with discretion to implement the resulting laws may construe them to preserve executive power in light of the democracy principle. Many recently enacted lame-duck laws confer discretion, even as they also limit executive
power. For example, a lame-duck law in Michigan prevents the state’s regulatory agencies from enacting stricter rules than the federal government has
already imposed absent a “clear and convincing need” for the stricter
rules. 381 Executive officials might understand “clear and convincing” more
liberally given the democracy principle. Likewise, a Wisconsin provision authorizes a legislative committee to suspend administrative rules “multiple
times,” without specifying how many such suspensions would be permissible. 382 Officials implementing this provision might understand the number
of suspensions to be limited. Because state officials will inevitably have to exercise their judgment as they determine the scope these and other provisions,
the democracy principle should inform their decisions to read new limits
narrowly and preserve executive power.
There is also reason to believe that this application of the democracy
principle has implications for American democracy as a whole. As we have
argued in previous work, much national policymaking today emerges
through the joint action of state and federal executives, in part because of
features of the federal Constitution that impede policymaking in Washing380. See supra notes 332–333 and accompanying text (discussing the role and force of
attorney general opinions).
381. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.232 (West 2019) (“Except for an emergency rule . . . ,
if the federal government has mandated that this state promulgate rules, an agency shall not
adopt or promulgate a rule more stringent than the applicable federally mandated standard
unless the director of the agency determines that there is a clear and convincing need to exceed
the applicable federal standard.”).
382. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 227.26(im) (West 2018) (“[T]he committee may act to suspend
a rule as provided under this subsection multiple times.”). The Wisconsin Supreme Court narrowly upheld this provision against a facial challenge, reasoning that “an endless suspension of
rules could not stand,” but that the provision could have some constitutional applications.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 946 N.W.2d 35, 59 (Wis. 2020). Another Wisconsin
provision that would have been a candidate for narrow executive interpretation attempted to
bar agencies from issuing guidance documents containing requirements that are not “explicitly
required or explicitly permitted” by an existing statute or rule. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 227.112(6)
(West 2018) (requiring an agency head to certify that any new guidance “contains no standard,
requirement, or threshold that is not explicitly required or explicitly permitted by a statute or a
rule that has been lawfully promulgated”). But the Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually struck
that provision down as an unconstitutional legislative incursion into executive power. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1, 946 N.W.2d at 69.
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ton, D.C. 383 And such “executive federalism” may in fact be more representative of the national popular will than decisions by the federal government 384—but only when state executives speak on behalf of their states. 385
When lame-duck state legislatures strip power from popularly elected executives, the states no longer provide a forum for such representative national
policymaking. Some recent power stripping has been quite explicit about the
consequences for national policy. For instance, the Wisconsin lame-duck
legislature limited the incoming governor’s power to negotiate over intergovernmental policies such as Medicaid, and it prevented the incoming attorney general from fulfilling his campaign pledge to withdraw from a
lawsuit seeking to invalidate the Affordable Care Act. 386 Even when state legislation is not similarly explicit, disempowering popularly elected executives
necessarily affects intergovernmental relations. To the extent executive federalism has emerged as a contemporary workaround for minoritarian, gridlocked federal government, state power grabs undermine national as well as
state governance. And invalidating such power grabs in accordance with the
democracy principle would therefore affect American democracy beyond
particular state borders.
C. Thwarting Popular Initiatives
The democracy principle can also shed new light on the relationship between representative and direct democracy. In recent years, the longstanding
tension between direct democracy and legislative lawmaking has grown
more acute. 387 The basic reasons for this tension are well-documented: the
very impetus for direct democracy—the intransigence or corruption of elected officials—creates incentives for those officials to undermine direct democracy. 388 Especially as partisan polarization has increased, commentators

383. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102
VA. L. REV. 953 (2016); Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483
(2017).
384. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 383, at 1009–15.
385. Cf. Seifter, supra note 383, at 519–30 (describing factors that can render governors
less accountable than presidents); David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 763, 775–76 (2017) (arguing that citizens have more informed views about governors
than other state officials).
386. S.B. 884, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017); Riley Vetterkind, Tony Evers Reverses Course on Withdrawing from Affordable Care Act Lawsuit, WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/tony-evers-reverses-course-on-with
drawing-from-affordable-care-act-lawsuit/article_2a0ceb59-9988-5a52-9242-50976729cc1d
.html [https://perma.cc/H8PS-2EXE].
387. See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, Lawmakers Strike Back Against Voter-Approved Ballot
Measures, PEW (July 28, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs
/stateline/2017/07/28/lawmakers-strike-back-against-voter-approved-ballot-measures [https://
perma.cc/NU6M-ZJ3Z].
388. See generally ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D.
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE (2001).
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have observed an uptick both in the resort to direct democracy and in state
officials’ efforts to limit the opportunities for and effects of popular initiatives. 389
In these fights, the people have state constitutions on their side. From
their inception through numerous revisions, state constitutions evince a robust commitment to popular self-rule. 390 In direct democracy states, this
commitment limits the extent to which government actors may countermand decisions made by the people themselves. Indeed, state courts have already recognized as much with respect to legislatively imposed initiative
procedures. Here, courts have invalidated burdensome requirements, holding
that only necessary restrictions may be imposed by legislatures on the initiative and referendum process. With respect to such cases, the democracy
principle unifies existing precedents across various states and bolsters results
sometimes articulated in narrower textual or doctrinal terms. In cases involving legislative repeals of initiatives, however, state courts have largely
gone astray. In those cases, the democracy principle should lead to results
more protective of the people’s will.
Consider first procedural burdens on direct democracy. 391 Virtually every initiative state has some version of what we will refer to as a directdemocracy canon. 392 This canon generally provides that “the power of initiative should be liberally construed to promote the democratic process.” 393 For
example, referencing the state constitutional provision for popular initiatives
(article IV, section 18), the Supreme Court of Maine has described its approach this way:
The broad purpose of the direct initiative is the encouragement of participatory democracy. By section 18 “the people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislative power,” and that constitutional provision must be

389. See, e.g., Povich, supra note 387.
390. See supra Part I.
391. We focus here on the initiative and referendum, bracketing other forms of direct
democracy. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1347–48 (1985)
(reviewing DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1984)) (noting that “virtually every state provides for some measure of
direct citizen involvement in lawmaking,” such as approving constitutional amendments and
debt issuance).
392. This is different from, but complementary to, the state court approaches described
in Hasen, supra note 313. Hasen’s article refers to a canon of interpretation under which statutory limits on suffrage are construed in the voter’s favor, and he identifies three fact patterns in
which state courts have applied the canon: “vote counting cases,” “voter eligibility/registration
cases,” and “candidate/party competitiveness cases.” Id. at 71–72.
393. 1 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 4:9 (7th ed. 2010 & Supp. 2019); see, e.g., Newsome v. Riley, 245 N.W.2d 374,
376 (Mich. 1976) (“Constitutional and statutory initiative and referendum provisions should
be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate rather than hamper the exercise
by the people of these reserved rights . . . .”).
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liberally construed to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to legislate. 394

Most commonly, state courts apply the direct-democracy canon when
legislatures attempt to impose procedural limitations on the initiative process, such as burdensome signature requirements or filing deadlines. For example, Michigan applies the canon as a form of strict scrutiny, explaining
that “the legislature may only create those restrictions [on the initiative process] which are necessary,” and that “[a]ny statute which is both unnecessary
for the effective administration of the initiative process and restrictive of the
initiative right is unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.” 395
A recent Michigan appellate decision is illustrative. During Michigan’s
lame-duck legislative session in 2018, the legislature imposed several new requirements on ballot initiatives. 396 One provided that no more than 15 percent of the required signatures supporting a ballot initiative could be from
any one congressional district. 397 The Michigan Constitution requires a
threshold number of signatures before an initiative can appear on the ballot,
but, as the court pointed out, the constitution does not impose geographic
restrictions on those signatures. 398 And the new limitation, the court concluded, “would undoubtedly drive petition circulators from the state’s population hubs and would impede circulators’ abilities to satisfy the ConstituConstitution’s signature requirements.” 399 The court discussed the directdemocracy canon, emphasizing “the long-held notion that, when interpreting a constitutional initiative or referendum provision, courts are to adopt a
liberal construction of the same in order ‘to facilitate, rather than hamper the
exercise of the people of these reserved rights.’” 400 The court concluded that
the 15-percent requirement imposed an undue and unconstitutional burden
on the constitutional rights of the people. 401
Other applications of the direct-democracy canon are substantive. For
example, states including South Dakota and California apply the principle

394. Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102–03 (Me. 1983) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 275 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1971)).
395. Wolverine Golf Club v. Hare, 180 N.W.2d 820, 831 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), aff’d, 185
N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1971); see also, e.g., Sudduth v. Chapman, 558 P.2d 806, 808–09 (Wash.
1977) (en banc) (“Those provisions of the constitution which reserve the right of initiative and
referendum are to be liberally construed to the end that this right may be facilitated, and not
hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further
than is necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this
constitutional right.”); Fabec v. Beck, 922 P.2d 330, 341 (Colo. 1996) (noting that the right of
initiative is fundamental and “should be liberally construed”).
396. H.B. 6596, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018) (enacted).
397. Id.
398. League of Women Voters v. Benson, No. 19-000084-MM, 2019 WL 6036702, at *6
(Mich. Ct. Cl. Sept. 27, 2019).
399. Id.
400. Id. at *7 (quoting Newsome v. Riley, 245 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)).
401. Id. at *6–7.
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when seeking to avoid invalidating initiatives. 402 Still other applications of
the canon occur at the boundary of substance and procedure. For example, a
number of states interpret their constitutions to prohibit legislatures from
preemptively amending pending initiatives. 403
This longstanding, if largely neglected, aspect of state jurisprudence is
fully consistent with the democracy principle, but there is another recurring
set of questions on which state courts have been much less respectful of popular majority rule. Many states—indeed, many of the same states that espouse a direct-democracy canon—allow state legislatures to repeal statutory
initiatives immediately upon their passage. In eleven of twenty-one statutory
initiative states, the constitution does not expressly address legislative repeals, 404 and the prevailing view is that legislatures are free to override initiatives. 405
The democracy principle suggests that the prevailing approach is misplaced. State courts’ principal justification for this approach is that state legislatures possess any power not denied to them. 406 But state constitutions do
limit legislative power in pertinent ways. Reflecting the structural commitment to popular sovereignty and political equality, the initiative and referenda were adopted for the very purpose of constraining legislative power and

402. See, e.g., SD Voice v. Noem, 380 F. Supp. 3d 939, 944 (D.S.D. 2019) (“Any judge
must view with great deference any legislative enactment, especially when enacted by a majority of the voters . . . .”); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748,
2755–56 (2005).
403. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co., 456 S.W.3d 27, 34 (Mo. 2015) (“Such
unilateral, preemptive action by the legislature serves as an end run around the constitutionally
protected right of the people of Missouri to enact legislation by ballot initiative.”); Letter from
Andrew Ketterer, Me. Att’y Gen., to Vinton E. Cassidy, Me. State Sen. (Feb. 26, 1997) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (interpreting the state constitution to bar the legislature from
amending a law while a contrary initiative is awaiting a vote); Eyman v. Wyman, 424 P.3d 1183
(Wash. 2018) (reaching a similar decision regarding the indirect initiative). The Michigan Supreme Court recently declined to decide the related question of whether the state legislature
could enact an initiative, thereby removing it from voters, and amend it in the same session.
See In re House of Reps. Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Const. of 2018 PA 368 & 369, 936
N.W.2d 241 (Mich. 2019) (mem.). The relevant provision states that initiative proposals are
submitted to voters unless they are “either enacted or rejected by the legislature without change
or amendment within 40 session days.” MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 9.
404. The states are Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
The remaining ten states restrict legislative overrides temporally, through supermajority requirements, or, in the case of California, by permitting initiatives to be overridden only
through popular votes. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); NOYES, supra note 94.
405. See J.E. Macy, Annotation, Power of Legislative Body to Amend, Repeal, or Abrogate
Initiative or Referendum Measure, or to Enact Measure Defeated on Referendum, 33 A.L.R.2d
1118 § 2 (2020) (collecting cases and stating that absent “special constitutional restraint” either
the legislature or the electorate “may amend or repeal an enactment by the other”).
406. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W. 707, 709 (S.D. 1915) (“No rule
of law is better settled throughout the United States than that a state Legislature has absolute
power to enact, that is, pass, amend, or repeal, any law whatsoever it pleases, unless it is prohibited from so doing by either the state or federal Constitutions . . . .”).
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enabling the people to supersede government officials. 407 An approach more
faithful to state constitutions’ democratic commitments would be what we
call an antinullification approach. Under this approach, (a) the state constitution and state statutes should be construed not to facilitate legislative overrides, and (b) legislation that repeals an initiative should be subject to
heightened scrutiny that requires a good reason, other than simple disagreement with the people’s will, for the repeal.
First, while the antinullification principle does not preclude all legislation that would override an initiative (just as most states that expressly limit
legislative overrides do not ban them), it counsels against legislative and judicial constructions that make overrides easier. A prime example is the audacious practice of legislative emergency declarations. In all eleven states
that lack express limits on legislative initiative overrides, the people may
overcome a legislative override through a veto referendum—but in nine of
those states, the referendum is available only if the legislation does not pertain to a legislatively declared “emergency.” 408 Seizing on that loophole, legislatures have invoked emergencies to insulate their overrides of controversial
initiatives. 409 State courts have divided over whether such emergency declarations are judicially reviewable at all, and, if so, over what standard to apply. 410
The democracy principle suggests that state courts should review these
declarations, wary of legislative nullification of the popular will. There are
many ways to formulate the standard, which may appropriately be a deferential one, but the ultimate question is whether there was indeed a plausible
emergency afoot—or whether the supposed emergency was an initiative that
the legislature disliked. This standard would apply in a number of conflicts
around the country. 411 For example, in 2016, South Dakota voters adopted
an initiative that established new campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying
rules. 412 These have been common subjects for direct democracy given that,
407. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE (2003).
408. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(3) (allowing veto referendum but specifying emergency exception). In Idaho, even emergency provisions are subject to referendum, Johnson v. Diefendorf, 57 P.2d 1068 (Idaho 1936), while Montana has no emergency provision.
409. For an early statement, see Comment, Nullification of the Referendum by Legislative
Declaration of Emergency, 31 YALE L.J. 655 (1922). For a more recent account, see, for example,
Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency: Washington’s Use of Emergency Clauses and the People’s
Right to Referendum, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 219 (2008–2009).
410. Compare Cavanaugh v. State, 644 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982) (not reviewable), Prescott v.
Sec’y of Commonwealth, 12 N.E.2d 462, 467 (Mass. 1938) (same), State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith,
133 N.E. 457, 461 (Ohio 1921) (same), and Greenberg v. Lee, 248 P.2d 324, 328 (Or. 1952)
(same), with Morris v. Goss, 83 A.2d 556, 561 (Me. 1951) (reviewable), and State ex rel.
Charleston v. Holman, 355 S.W.2d 946, 950–51 (Mo. 1962) (same).
411. See generally Alan Greenblatt, Lawmakers Eye Changes to Ballot Measures—Passed
and Future, GOVERNING (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/govlawmakers-block-ballot-measures.html [https://perma.cc/8R78-2PHH].
412. See S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2016 STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES 23–25, https://sdsos
.gov/elections-voting/assets/2016FullTextoftheBallotQuestionProposals.pdf [https://perma.cc
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to put it mildly, “legislators’ interests in maintaining their offices are not always consonant with the public interest in these areas.” 413 Invoking its emergency powers, the South Dakota legislature then overrode this popularly
enacted measure. 414 Because of the emergency declaration, the state legislature did not have to justify its override, and the nullifying legislation was not
susceptible to a popular referendum. Under our analysis, the state legislature
would have had to explain how ethics and campaign-finance restrictions
gave rise to an emergency, and a court could have invalidated the legislature’s repeal for a failure to provide a convincing explanation.
Reforming the emergency exception would constrain legislative attempts to make overrides easier. What about attempted overrides themselves? The democracy principle supports heightened scrutiny for such
attempts.
As with any principle that imposes increased scrutiny, there will be
harder and easier cases. For a relatively easy case, consider instances in
which governors have refused to implement validly adopted initiatives based
on policy disagreement. In Maine, for example, former Governor Paul
LePage refused to implement Medicaid expansion after voters approved it. 415
A court in Maine rejected his refusal, holding that “[a]lthough the Governor
may believe implementation to be unwise and disagree with the Act as a
matter of policy, he may not ignore the will of the people and refuse to take
any action toward accomplishing the policy objectives of the Act.” 416 In
reaching this decision, the court cited the state’s take care clause. 417 Although
that analysis is sensible—the initiative is a law, and the governor refused to
execute it—obligations of faithful execution are famously malleable and have
been used to expand as well as contract chief-executive power. 418
The democracy principle bolsters decisions rejecting gubernatorial nullification, providing a firmer basis for concluding that governors lack discretion to override decisions of the people. Like other direct-democracy
constitutions, Maine’s constitution expressly denies the governor power to
/FXY6-FHKB]; South Dakota Measure 22—Revise Campaign Finance and Lobbying Laws—
Results: Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections
/2016/results/south-dakota-ballot-measure-22-campaign-finance-overhaul
[https://perma
.cc/F8XT-MVJ8].
413. DINAN, supra note 44, at 250.
414. H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2017) (enacted); see Monica Davey & Nicholas
Confessore, South Dakota Legislators Seek Hasty Repeal of Ethics Law Voters Passed, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/south-dakota-repeal-ethicslaw-vote.html [https://perma.cc/DYM2-Y9D8].
415. See Abby Goodnough, A Vote Expanded Medicaid in Maine. The Governor Is Ignoring It., N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/health/mainemedicaid-expansion-lepage.html [https://perma.cc/BBA7-RV3V].
416. Me. Equal Just. Partners v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. BCDAP-18-02, 2018 WL 6264120, at *8 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2018).
417. Id. at *5; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 12.
418. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1835 (2016); Seifter, supra note 63 (surveying state case law).
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veto popular initiatives, distinguishing the gubernatorial role in representative and direct lawmaking. 419 That text speaks to the underlying commitment to popular sovereignty: the people prevail over their representative
institutions, and initiatives offer a way around legislatures and governors
alike. Yet the text alone reaches only the veto, not a functionally equivalent
failure to implement.
A holistic interpretation of the Maine Constitution extends the prohibition. Gubernatorial failure to implement an initiative violates the structural
commitment that explains and unifies a number of more specific textual
clauses, including the foundational declaration that “[a]ll power is inherent
in the people” 420 and provisions for popular initiatives and referenda. 421 A
contrary argument—that Maine’s foreclosure of gubernatorial vetoes but silence on failure to implement blesses the latter—misconceives the project of
state constitutional interpretation. A particular instantiation of a broad
commitment should not defeat all other applications; instead, silences or
ambiguities should be interpreted in a way that comports with the document
as a whole.
Recognizing the democracy principle’s application to such cases—rather
than understanding them only in terms of the separation of powers—would
not only support existing decisions but also provide a framework in which to
reason about harder cases. The Medicaid expansion context alone presents a
number of more complicated disputes. For example, in 2018, Utah voters
adopted a popular initiative to expand Medicaid after the state legislature
had declined to do so. 422 The initiative contemplated a full Affordable Care
Act expansion that would cover adults up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level and provided for a state sales-tax increase to fund the state’s share
of expansion costs. 423 The Utah legislature then passed a law that “significantly changed and limited the coverage expansion that the voters adopted,”
most notably by requiring the state to seek a federal waiver to offer coverage
to only 100 percent of the federal poverty level. 424 The federal government’s
rejection of that waiver application has eclipsed questions about the state legislative override, but those questions remain important.

419. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 19 (“The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to
any measure approved by vote of the people.”).
420. Id. art. I, § 2.
421. Id. art. IV, §§ 17–18.
422. See UTAH LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, PROPOSITION NUMBER 3 (2018),
https://elections.utah.gov/Media/Default/2018%20Election/Issues%20on%20the%20Ballot
/Proposition%203%20-%20Ballot%20Title%20and%20Impartial%20Analysis.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/223S-UKSR].
423. Id.
424. MaryBeth Musumeci, Madeline Guth, Robin Rudowitz & Cornelia Hall, From Ballot
Initiative to Waivers: What Is the Status of Medicaid Expansion in Utah?, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.kff.org/%20medicaid/issue-brief/from-ballot-initiative-to-waiverswhat-is-the-status-of-medicaid-expansion-in-utah/ [https://perma.cc/GPE9-Y2HE]; see S.B. 96,
2019 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019) (enacted).

930

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:859

Legislatures may have good reason to clarify or even correct the policies
set forth in initiatives. As Beth Garrett observed, state and local government
operates through “hybrid democracy,” in which “policy is determined . . . by
a combination of direct and representative institutions” interacting with one
another. 425 Moreover, other factors, such as the passage of time and intervening circumstances, may also transform apparent nullification into
amendment or even implementation. 426 We therefore do not contend that
initiatives must always prevail over contrary legislation. But nullification is a
constitutional concern, and courts should interrogate whether initiativealtering legislation is serving valid purposes or instead simply thwarting the
will of the people.
Here again, nonjudicial actors also have a role to play. Executive officials
including attorneys general and secretaries of state often conduct an initial
review of proposed initiatives, 427 and they should review with the democracy
principle in mind. Officials involved in the legislative process, including
nonpartisan legislative staff or research bureaus, may identify the principle
as a guidepost for legislative decisionmaking. On the back end, those who
implement nullifying laws that do go into effect may exercise their legal discretion to construe those laws narrowly, in ways that limit erosion of the underlying initiatives.
Protecting popular initiatives and referenda again illustrates how the
democracy principle may affect national as well as state-level democracy.
Simply put, there is no national direct democracy. But state initiatives and
referenda offer ways for the national public to work around representative
institutions and engage directly on policy questions. 428 It is not a coincidence
that many recent statutory and constitutional initiatives have concerned
questions of nationwide import and interest, from Medicaid expansion to
criminal justice reform to marijuana legalization. The people of the several
states—and thus of the United States—have sought to circumvent elected officials through the only available channel for direct popular engagement. To
the extent the constitutional democracy principle safeguards popular majority rule in the states, then, so too may it help counterbalance national minority rule.
The justifications state courts have offered for concluding that state legislatures may freely override initiatives are not compelling. First, they have
placed much weight on the notion of plenary state legislative power. But as
Robert Williams has observed, “[a] complete picture of legislative power under a state constitution must include the later waves of reaction to state legis-

425. Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 1096–98 (2005).
426. Even states that expressly limit legislative overrides do not entirely insulate initiatives. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (providing that an initiative law “may not be repealed by the legislature within two years of its effective date”).
427. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE
21ST CENTURY 23 (2002).
428. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.

March 2021]

The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions

931

lative abuses, reflected in the procedural and substantive limitations on the
legislature adopted over the years.” 429 The real question is always whether
the legislature has the power, an inquiry that includes asking whether a state
constitution has limited power that may have started out as plenary. 430 In
keeping with the longstanding and ongoing state constitutional commitment
to popular self-rule, provisions for direct democracy have imposed just such
limits. 431
Second, some state courts reason from the legal status of a passed initiative. They conclude that because a popular initiative has the same effect as a
legislative enactment, it must likewise be unconditionally subject to legislative repeal. 432 But the distinct means by which initiatives and legislative enactments are adopted underscore that equivalent legal status does not
eliminate procedural distinctions. Much as state constitutions embrace different routes to passing initiatives and legislation in the first instance, so too
may they contemplate different routes to revising or repealing these laws.
There are, to be sure, arguments against an antinullification principle.
For example, courts might survey the numerous state constitutions that expressly impose limits on legislative overrides and conclude, in another transstate variant of expressio unius, that the absence of such provisions in other
state constitutions constitutes a deliberate omission. As we have noted
above, while evidence from other state constitutions may rightly inform interpretation, the absence of a provision in one constitution cannot alone be
dispositive. 433 Whatever their common features, state constitutions are separate documents, and they always contain distinct provisions.
A stronger, related argument is that historical practice or gloss settles the
issue: courts have blessed legislative overrides for many decades, and the
people have not amended state constitutions to foreclose nullification, even
as other states expressly do so. Although this argument is more persuasive
than the invocations of plenary legislative power courts have offered, it does
not account for impediments to such constitutional amendment (indeed, the
question rather quickly assumes meta dimensions given state legislative efforts to restrict constitutional initiatives), nor does it grapple with the actual
stakes of the question. However longstanding, legislative nullification of
popular initiatives is inconsistent with the state constitutional commitment
to popular self-rule. It deserves close scrutiny and as-yet unsupplied justification. When legislatures attempt to invalidate voters’ choices, the democra-

429. Robert F. Williams, Comment, On the Importance of a Theory of Legislative Power
Under State Constitutions, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 57, 62–63 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
430. See Dodd, supra note 292, at 160 (describing “the doctrine of implied limitations” as
“the most important single manifestation of judicial action” in state constitutional law).
431. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., AMY BRIDGES, DEMOCRATIC BEGINNINGS 133–34
(2015).
432. See, e.g., Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 979 (Idaho 1943) (noting the “equal footing”
of “initiative legislation” and “legislative acts”).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 378–379.
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cy principle should factor explicitly into the constitutional analysis. Courts
and the public alike should recognize that the people have state constitutional resources—not just rhetorical or electoral ones—with which to challenge
their representatives.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of state constitutional law have long argued that a full picture of
American constitutionalism must include the states. Nowhere is this more
important than with respect to democracy. In this Article, we have described
how the state constitutional tradition embraces a robust democracy principle. Properly understood, this principle empowers popular majorities and
establishes safeguards against minority rule. The democracy principle is
rooted in the text, history, and structure of state founding documents and is
remarkably consistent across states—even as it is markedly distinct from
federal constitutional commitments. Our account explores how fifty-one
founding documents might better navigate the twin perils of majoritarianism
and minoritarianism in the United States.
In addition to painting a more complete picture of American constitutionalism, recovering the democracy principle promises immediate practical
consequences. State constitutions foreclose a number of antidemocratic behaviors, from extreme partisan gerrymandering to lame-duck power grabs to
nullification of popular initiatives. They also offer resources for approaching
controversies we have not explored this Article. To respond to numerous
threats to democratic governance, including impediments to ballot access
and the integrity of election administration, government officials, organizers,
and the public alike should look beyond the federal Constitution to state
constitutions. Even though it cannot end there, reclaiming democracy is a
project that must begin in the states.

